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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The concept of standards includes many aspects pertaining to outcomes or processes 
such as quality, safety, ‘authenticity’ and the ‘goodness of the production process’ (Farina 
and Reardon, 2000). A series of recent studies have identified the spread of ‘high standards’ 
as having a fundamental impact on the process of development (Farina and Reardon, 2000; 
Henson et al., 2000; McCluskey, 2007; Swinnen, 2007). And although high standards 
products play a much larger role in developed countries, they also affect less developed 
countries (LDC) through trade and FDI, etc. (Jaffee and Henson, 2005; Reardon et al., 2003; 
Swinnen, 2007). 
Early studies predicted the rise of standards might have sharp negative impact on 
equity and poverty (Farina and Reardon, 2000). In contrast, the more recent research suggests 
a more nuanced picture of the effect of standards on poverty and development. For example, 
Dries and Swinnen (2004) find that high standards lead to increased vertical coordination in 
supply chains that is realized in their study area by the emergence of extensive contracting 
between processing companies and farmers. Minten et al. (2009) and Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) also find increased vertical coordination in newly emerging supply chains between 
buyers and poor, small farmers in African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal. 
From the literature, we can find two hotly debated issues (Reardon et al., 2009): 
Whether the small holders are actually excluded from taking part in the high standards 
sector? And, does inclusion raise incomes? To address these two questions properly, we build 
a partial equilibrium and a general equilibrium model in Chapter 2 and 3 respectively, and 
then give some extensions and applications of the CGE model in Chapter 4 and 5. Even 
though both the partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium model are used to address the 
issue of standards, they have different emphases. The partial equilibrium model deals with 
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the introduction and growth of high standards sector itself while the general equilibrium 
model focuses on the impact of expansion of high standards sector. Since both partial 
equilibrium and general equilibrium models have advantages and disadvantages, using one of 
them in the specific contexts of Chapter 2 and 3 is suitable. 
Chapter 2 develops a formal theory of the endogenous process of the introduction of 
high quality products in developing countries and results from joint research with Thijs 
Vandemoortele, Scott Rozelle and Jo Swinnen (See Vandemoortele et al., 2009). Initial 
differences in income and capital and transaction costs are shown to affect the emergence of 
and the size of the high quality economy. Initial differences in the production structure and 
the nature of transaction costs – as well as the possibility of contracting between producers 
and processors – are shown to determine which producers are included in the high quality 
economy, and which not. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of high standards food chains on household welfare 
taking into account general equilibrium effects and market imperfections and results from 
joint research with Jikun Huang, d’Artis Kancs, Scott Rozelle and Jo Swinnen (See Xiang et 
al., 2010). To measure structural production changes and welfare effects on rural and urban 
households, our model has two types of agents, five kinds of products and four types of 
factors. We calibrate the model using dataset from China. The simulation results show that 
how poor rural households are affected depends on the nature of the shocks leading to the 
expansion of high standards sector and the market imperfections, and whether the poor can 
gain through the labor market if they are excluded from high standards farming. 
Chapter 4 extends the CGE model in Chapter 3 to account for contracts. The rationale 
of contracts may lie in its power to overcome vertical externality and increase output and 
profit of processors. The profit surplus of farms due to contracts from processors may be 
partially transferred to processors through bargaining. We simulate decision making of 
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processors and welfare effects of contracts. Our results show that processors may choose their 
credit grantees based on grantees’ characteristics of both efficiency and bargaining power. 
The weaker bargaining power of poorest rural households increases profit transfers to the 
processor, and hence increases their probabilities of getting the contracts and their income 
accordingly. 
Chapter 5 applies the CGE model to account for the impact of the dairy scandal and 
the following reforms in China. The scandal and the following dairy reforms in China have a 
huge impact on the production and marketing of milk. The peculiar structure of China’s dairy 
sector dominated by small farmers is vulnerable to such kind of shocks. We simulate the 
possible impacts of the scandal and reforms by increasing preference for high standards dairy 
products, increasing fixed costs of dairy farming and giving subsidies to large farmers. 
Results show that the poorest rural households lose in nearly all the scenarios except when 
consumers’ preference for high standards dairy products increase while import increases not a 
lot and when increased investment costs lead to high preference for high standards food. 
Chapter 6 concludes and gives some policy implications and advices for future 
researches. 
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Chapter 2. Quality Standards and Inclusion of Small Producers in Value Chains: A 
Partial Equilibrium Model1
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the industrial 
organization and international location of production. One of the most important mechanisms 
underlying the globalization process lies in the transfer of advanced production capabilities 
to low-wage economies. These capabilities comprise both an increase in productivity and in 
product quality (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Sutton (2001) 
argues that the quality aspect is far the more important element: poor productivity can be 
offset by low wage rates, but until firms attain some threshold level of quality, they cannot 
achieve any sales in global markets, however low the local wage level. 
These quality requirements affect poorer countries through several channels.2
                                                 
1  This chapter is based on joint research with Thijs Vandemoortele, Scott Rozelle and Jo Swinnen (See 
Vandemoortele et al., 2009). 
 First, 
increasing public quality requirements in richer countries are also imposed on imports and 
consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting nations (Jaffee and 
Henson, 2005; Otsuki et al., 2001; Unnevehr, 2000). Second, global supply chains are 
playing an increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these 
vertically coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing quality standards 
(Swinnen, 2005; 2007). For example, modern retailing companies increasingly dominate 
international and local markets in fruits and vegetables, including those in many poorer 
2 This chapter focuses on the development implications of changes in the demand for high quality products  
There are several related areas in the literature on product quality standards, including a) analyses of 
asymmetric information problems which may be one of the reasons for companies or public regulators to 
introduce standards (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Gardner, 2003; Leland, 1979); b) studies on the role of 
standards in reducing consumption externalities (Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Copeland and Taylor, 1995); c) the 
role of standards in providing non-tariff trade protection (Anderson et al., 2004; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Otsuki 
et al., 2001); and d) the political economy of standards  (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008).  
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countries, and have begun to set standards for food quality and safety in this sector wherever 
they are doing business (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Henson et al., 2000). Third, rising 
investment in processing and retailing in developing countries also has begun to be translated 
into higher quality standards, as buyers are making new demands on local producers in order 
to serve the high-end income consumers in the domestic economy or to minimize transaction 
costs in their regional distribution and supply chains (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Dries et al., 
2004; Reardon et al., 2003).   
Importantly, the early literature posited that the rise of quality standards could have 
sharp negative influences on equity and poverty. Several of the studies argued that modern 
supply chains in developing countries would systematically exclude the poor and negatively 
affect the incomes of small farmers; in other words, it was being suggested that unlike other 
waves of rising economic activity, the poor would suffer from this process (Farina and 
Reardon, 2000). The predictions from these studies included the poorest parts of the world. 
For example, several studies of farm communities in Latin America and Africa argued that 
small farmers were being left behind in the supermarket-driven horticultural marketing and 
trade (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey et al., 2004; Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon 
et al., 2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001). In a study on Kenya, Minot and Ngigi (2004) 
demonstrated that modern supply chains put intense pressure on smallholders (although 
smallholders were still participating). Even more extreme, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, 
almost all of the fruits and vegetables being produced for exports were being cultivated on 
large industrial estates. Likewise, Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) argued that the rise of 
supermarkets in Southern Africa failed to help small producers who were almost completely 
excluded from dynamic urban markets due to quality and safety requirements.    
Recent research suggests a more nuanced picture of the effect on poverty and its 
overall development implications. Dries and Swinnen (2004) find that high standards lead to 
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increased vertical coordination in supply chains that is realized in their study area by the 
emergence of extensive contracting between processing companies and farmers. The rise of 
contracting, far from leading to the exclusion of poorer farmers, is shown to improve access 
to credit, technology and quality inputs for poor, small farmers that heretofore were faced 
with binding liquidity and information constraints due to poorly developed input markets. 
Minten et al. (2009) and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also find increased vertical 
coordination in newly emerging supply chains between buyers and poor, small farmers in 
African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal. According to their work, poor rural 
households experienced measurable gains from supplying high standard horticulture 
commodities to global retail chains. In China Wang et al. (2009) found that while rising 
urban incomes and emergence of a relatively wealthy middle class were associated with an 
enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vegetables, almost all of the increased supply was 
being produced by small, relatively poor farmers that sell to small, relatively poor traders. 
Despite sharp shifts in the downstream segment of the food chain towards modern retailing 
(e.g., there has been a rapid increase in the share of food purchased by urban consumers in 
supermarkets, convenience stores and restaurants), modern marketing chains have almost 
zero penetration to the farm level.  
These conflicting empirical findings are puzzling. Why would one observe such 
different outcomes? To understand better why different outcomes may emerge, this chapter is 
the first3
                                                 
3  Exceptions are some recent studies on the relationships between the local suppliers and modern 
processors/retailers in developing countries focusing on vertical coordination and rent distribution (Marcoul and 
Veysierre, 2008; Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2007). However these studies do not seek to explain the variations in 
the structure of the modern supply chains that one observes. 
 to develop a formal theory of the process where modern supply chains and demand 
signals are directing producers to grow and sell high quality and safe foods. We will use this 
theory to analyze whether this process may result in different outcomes when economies are 
characterized by different structural conditions. In particular, we analyze which producers are 
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most likely to be included in these modern supply chains, and how the inclusion process is 
affected by factors such as the productivity distribution of producers and the nature of the 
transaction costs involved. In the last part of the chapter we analyze the impact of contracting 
between processors and producers. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present a formal model to 
analyse the endogenous process of the introduction of high quality products in developing 
countries. We discuss the structural factors of the market equilibrium resulting from this 
model. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 analyze how the inclusivity of this process towards producers is 
influenced by respectively the production structure and the nature of transaction costs. 
Section 2.5 discusses the impact of contracting between processors and producers on this 
process and its inclusivity. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2. The Model 
The specification of the basic model that follows implements all the main features 
that appear to be relevant based on the literature and economic intuitions. Specifically, in the 
model: (a) consumers value quality as in the standard vertical product differentiation 
framework; (b) Producers can supply quality by undertaking production processes that are 
costlier than those required for the alternative, low-quality product; and (c) producers operate 
in a competitive industry (with free entry and exit). 
 
2.2.1. Demand 
To model the demand side, we draw upon the vertical differentiation literature. In this 
literature, product variants differ in their quality and consumers differ in their willingness to 
pay for quality (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Shaked and Sutton, 
1982, 1983; Spence, 1975; Tirole, 1988). Ellickson (2006) examines vertical differentiation 
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in the context of grocery retailing and Roe and Sheldon (2007) examine labelling and 
credence features of products using a vertical differentiation model. Moschini et al. (2008) 
assess the economics of geographical indications within a vertical product differentiation 
framework. The model in Moschini et al. (2008) is the closest one to ours in modelling 
demand. 
We consider the unit-demand version of the standard vertical product differentiation 
model whereby each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. The model is adjusted for a 
limited number of product types and relates income directly to the preferences for quality, 
following Tirole (1988).4
Assume that there are only two types of products with different qualities in this 
market, a basic low quality (
  
Lφ ) product and a high quality ( H Lφ φ> ) product. When both 
qualities are available, consumers choose among three options: 
(1) 
       if the high quality good is bought
        if the low quality good is bought
0                  otherwise
H H
L L
i P
U i P
φ
φ
−
= −


 
where Hφ  and Lφ  are the qualities, and HP  and LP  are the unit consumer prices of 
respectively the high and low standards product; the index ( 1, )i I I R+∈ − ⊆ represents 
consumer income. Consumers with higher incomes are assumed to have higher preferences 
for quality. The distribution of income ( )F i  is uniform between 1I −  and I , where the latter 
is the highest income among consumers. We assume that the distribution of income does not 
change when income grows so that an increase of aggregate income can be represented by an 
increase of I . 
                                                 
4 Our approach implicitly assumes that the introduction of high quality reflects consumer preferences. Another 
reason why a company may want to introduce certain quality or process standards is to reduce transaction costs 
in sourcing and selling (Fulponi, 2007; Henson, 2006; McCluskey, 2007). Since the introduction of quality or 
process standards for these purposes would also require specific investments by suppliers (hence higher 
production costs) and (increased) transaction costs for the processors, most of such effects would be similar to 
the analysis in this chapter. 
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When both high quality (HQ) and low quality (LQ) products are bought by some 
consumers when available and some consumers buy nothing (i.e., there is an ‘uncovered’ 
market), the aggregate market demand functions DHQ  and 
D
LQ  are: 
(2) D H LH
P PQ M I
φ
 −
= − 
 
 
(3) D H L LL
L
P P PQ M
φ φ
 −
= − 
 
 
subject to 1L H L
L
P P PI
φ φ
−
+ > > , where M is the total number of consumers in this economy 
and H Lφ φ φ≡ −  represents the quality difference. If H L
P PI
φ
−
<  there will be no demand for 
high quality products ( )0DHQ = .5
 
 
2.2.2. Supply 
 
On the supply side, we assume a standard competitive industry populated by 
numerous producers who behave as price takers. In our model all producers are able to 
produce either the high quality or the low quality product. To start, we assume that producers 
are identical. Later in the chapter we will relax this assumption and analyze how producer 
differences affect their integration into the high quality economy. 
We assume further that producers have a production technology that requires a unit 
cost Hc  and Lc , for the high and low quality product respectively, and that H Lc c k= + , 
where k is the per unit additional capital costs for producing the high quality product.6
                                                 
5 See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988) for formal derivations of these conclusions.  
 
Finally, for simplicity, we assume that the other costs remain the same and that producers can 
6 We ignore quality uncertainty, so each farm can meet the processor’s quality threshold with certainty if it 
makes a predetermined capital investment. We also currently ignore issues of contracting and contract 
enforcement in the HQ chain. For more details about this, see Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) who show that the 
premium itself will depend on the contract enforcement conditions.  
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produce the same number of units of the commodity regardless of whether they produce low 
quality or high quality commodities.7
 
   
2.2.3. Marketing and Trade 
Once the products are produced in response to consumer demand, our model needs to 
account for the transfer of the commodities from farm to plate. For simplicity we assume that 
one unit of production is identical to one unit at retail (consumer) level for both high and low 
quality. We use different marketing assumptions for the LQ products and the HQ products. 
We assume that producers sell their LQ commodity in villages and city markets at price LP  
under perfect competition. For the HQ supply chain, we assume that ‘processors’ (which may 
represent any company involved in processing, marketing or retailing) purchase the HQ 
commodity from producers at price Hp  and resell this commodity to consumers at price HP . 
We consider that these companies incur a unit transaction cost τ  in sourcing from producers. 
Under perfect competition and free entry and exit for processors, it follows that the consumer 
price of the commodity is the sum of the producer price and the transaction cost, such that 
H HP p τ= + .
8
 
 
                                                 
7 This assumption is consistent, for example, with a farmer who may produce 100 litres of non-cooled, high-
bacteria milk if operating in the low quality market or, after an investment in a cooling tank is made, 100 litres 
of cooled, low-bacteria milk if operating in the high quality market. 
8 We ignore ‘processing costs’ because they only complicate the mathematics but do not affect the conclusions. 
We also considered an alternative model with a monopolistic market structure in processing. Again, this vastly 
complicated the model without yielding substantial differences in the key results regarding the issues where this 
chapter focuses on. See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) for an analysis of the role and effects of competition in 
the emergence and growth of a high quality economy. 
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2.2.4. Structural Factors and the Market Equilibrium 
With producers’ supply of low and high quality products determined by their 
respective marginal costs Lc  and Hc  and the demand functions (2) and (3) we can derive the 
market equilibrium level of LQ products ( )*LX  and HQ products ( )*HX  as follows:  
(4) * LL
L
ckX M τ
φ φ
 +
= − 
 
 
(5) *H
kX M I τ
φ
 +
= − 
 
 
Equations (4) and (5) incorporate the relationship between a series of structural 
variables and the relative importance of the high and low quality economies. For each of the 
key variables ( ), , ,I k τ φ  one can identify threshold levels (either minima or maxima) for the 
high quality economy (HQE) to exist, i.e. for * 0HX > . For positive levels of 
*
HX , one can use 
comparative statics to show how the variables affect the size of the HQE. 
Income ( )I . The size of the HQE is directly related to the level of income in the 
economy. A minimum level of income is required for a HQE to emerge. Formally, the 
condition is: kI τ
φ
+
> . Hence, one of the basic results that falls out of our model is consistent 
with the observation that HQ markets are more likely found in countries with higher incomes 
than in countries with lower incomes. Additionally, once income is above this threshold, the 
model shows that the HQE becomes larger when income increases 
*
0HX M
I
 ∂
= > ∂ 
. The 
positive effect of I  on *HX  is also consistent with the observation that HQ production 
systems tend to emerge first in export sectors in developing countries. For example in many 
African economies HQ production is limited to supply chains targeted to (high income) EU 
consumer markets while production for domestic markets is limited to LQ production. 
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Capital costs ( )k . In many developing countries capital constraints are important and 
the real cost of capital is high. According to our model this is another reason that HQ markets 
are less likely to emerge in developing countries. If capital costs of producing HQ are too 
high, i.e. if k Iφ τ> − , then no HQE will emerge. Moreover, given that a HQE exists, the size 
of the HQE will be smaller if capital costs are higher, as 
*
0HX M
k φ
∂
= − <
∂
. 
Quality difference ( )φ : An additional condition for the emergence of a HQE is that 
the high quality level is sufficiently larger than the low quality level, given the extra cost of 
that quality difference. Formally, the quality difference φ  must be such that k
I
τφ +>  holds. 
Given that this condition is fulfilled, the HQE will be larger for larger quality differences 
( )*
2 0
H M kX τ
φ φ
 +∂
= > 
∂ 
. 
However, as we will show in the next sections, these conclusions need to be nuanced 
when one allows explicitly for details on the production structure as well as on the nature of 
transaction costs in the model. 
 
2.3. Production Structure 
In addition to being able to predict the factors that underlie the emergence of the 
HQE, our model can also be used to gain insights on what types of producers are most likely 
to join the HQE (when it emerges) and what types of producers will likely be left out. As 
discussed in the introduction, this issue has attracted a lot of policy attention and academic 
debate. Some studies have argued that smallholders are excluded from HQE due to scale 
diseconomies (Reardon et al., 2009) and higher transaction costs (Minten et al., 2009); others 
have argued that this is not (necessarily) the case (Reardon et al., 2009). 
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The arguments used in the literature are often quite simplistic. In fact, they may also 
be too simplistic. For example, the impact of scale economies is not as trivial as often 
argued.9
Since the impact of scale economies can be ambiguous, contingent on the type of 
commodities, in our analysis here we focus on two other more direct factors, the initial 
production structure of the economy (productivity heterogeneity in our model) and the nature 
of the transaction costs. We will show that both factors have an important impact on the size 
of the HQE and on who is included in the HQE. 
 Scale economies can differ strongly between activities (e.g. extensive grain farming 
compared to intensive vegetable or dairy production) and may be influenced by local 
institutions and market constraints. 
One of our key arguments is that initial conditions matter. One might expect different 
outcomes from the emergence of the HQE in rural settings that have highly unequal 
distributions of land resources (such as in some nations in Latin America and parts of the 
former Soviet Union—which have some individuals holding massive estates and many 
smaller, relatively poor farmers), compared to rural societies characterized by more 
egalitarian distributions of cultivated land (e.g., China, Vietnam and Poland). In the rest of 
the analysis we call this the production structure of the rural economy. In this section we will 
formally show that the initial production structure indeed matters: the share of smallholders 
in the production system – and the existence of large holdings amongst the smallholders – 
will affect both the size of the HQE and the integration of smallholders into the HQE. To 
analyze this we relax the assumption of a homogenous producer structure. This means that k  
                                                 
9 There is an extensive literature showing how farm productivity, and in particular the relationship between size 
and productivity, tends to differ importantly by commodity (e.g. Allen and Lueck, 1998; Pollak, 1985). For 
example, while large producers may have scale advantages in land intensive commodities, such as wheat or 
corn, this is typically much less the case in labor intensive commodities, such as fruits and vegetables. In fact, 
there are cases in which small-scale producers may have advantages over larger farmers. In the production of 
some HQ commodities, small farmers may have an advantage over larger farmers because of the importance of 
labor governance and the quality of the labor input. This implies that the inclusion or exclusion of small farms is 
likely to depend importantly on the type of the commodity. This is consistent with findings from Wang et al. 
(2009) on China and Minten et al. (2009) on Madagascar which find that smallholders are extensively included 
in labor intensive fruits and vegetable production. 
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is not necessarily identical for all producers. In line with our general model, we introduce 
producer heterogeneity by varying the capital cost k . 
We assume that capital cost jk  for producer j follows a Markov process independent 
across producers10 [ ],j k kk k kγ γ∈ − + and is uniformly distributed across N producers with   
{ }1,...,j N∀ =  and [ ]0,k kγ ∈  with 0k ≥ . For simplicity, we assume that individual 
producers only produce one unit of the high standards product, when they are involved in the 
HQE.11 This is a strong but widely-used assumption (see e.g., Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2009; 
Van Long et al., 2007).12, 13
We can now consider variation in the production structure by considering changes in 
 Producers with lower capital costs are more efficient. 
kγ . Specifically, the extreme case of homogeneous farms – which was the assumption in the 
first part of the chapter – is represented by 0kγ = . The efficiency distribution is increasingly 
unequal as kγ  increases. With any given distribution, the average efficiency is represented by 
capital cost k (as in the general model). 
The supply curves for heterogeneous and homogeneous production structures are 
shown in Figure 2.1. In this graphical representation ( )0SH kX γ =  represents the supply 
function for homogeneous producers. Likewise, ( )0SH kX γ >  is the supply function for 
heterogeneous producers.  
                                                 
10  This assumption is widely used in the literature on trade, e.g., Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003). 
Following this assumption the equilibrium in our model can be regarded as a stationary equilibrium 
(Hopenhayn, 1992). Under this assumption, industrial positive profits can co-exist with free entry. 
11 Alternatively, one could fix the inputs and consider variation in output, or consider variations in input and/or 
output size. Our specification is closer to the basic model specification and allows to derive the key results. 
12 The assumption is sufficient to guarantee that production capacities of farmers are limited, which is necessary 
to allow for co-existence of free entry/exit and heterogeneous farmers. Otherwise, if the capacities are unlimited, 
the most productive farmers will dominate the market and exclude all other farmers. 
13 By this assumption, we rule out scale economies. This assumption can be relaxed, at the cost of additional 
complexity, without affecting our basic results, because the critical to aggregate individual output to get market 
supply is the productivity of the producer which is indifferent between producing for the HQE and for the LQE. 
As we can see later, our main result is that more heterogeneous production structure will induce early 
emergence of HQE but with less expansion speed after its emergence. This result does not depend on the source 
of heterogeneity. Any kind of heterogeneity will finally lead to the heterogeneity of productivity, which is 
critical in our analysis. 
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Figure 2.1 HQ Production under Different Production Structures 
  
When producers choose to produce the HQ products, under the assumption that one 
producer produces only one unit of output in the HQE, their profits 14 H Hp c− are , 
with H Lc c k= +  where k  is the capital cost of the producer that is indifferent between 
producing for the HQE and the LQE. Using this, we can then derive the aggregate supply of 
HQ products as: 
(6) 
( )
2 2
k
k
kS
H j
k kk
N k kNX dk
γ
γ
γ γ−
+ −
= =∫ .15
This, in turn, leads to a new expression for the equilibrium quantity in the HQ market: 
 
                                                 
14 Based on our assumptions, the profits will be kept by the involved producers. In reality, the profits will be 
shared between producers and processors according to their bargaining powers (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2007). 
15 When 0kγ = , the HQ output 
S
HX  is completely determined by demand in the equilibrium (perfectly elastic 
supply) and equation (7) is irrelevant. 
*
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(7) ( )* 1
1
2
k
H
k
k
X M I M
N
γ τ
φφ
γ
 − +  = −  
  +  
 
. 
Comparing (5) and (7) yields some important insights. The second term of the right 
hand side (RHS) of condition (7) shows that the HQE will emerge at lower income levels 
with a heterogeneous production structure than with a more homogeneous structure. 
Specifically, kkI γ τ
φ
− +
>  is the condition for the HQE to emerge. With 0kγ >  the required 
income level is lower than when 0kγ = . In addition, the required income level (for the 
emergence of a HQE) declines when the distribution is more unequal (that is, when kγ  is 
higher). The intuitive reason for this finding is that when an economy faces a more 
heterogeneous production structure, this implies that there are more efficient producers 
among the entire set of producers, ceteris paribus. As a result of this, these producers will be 
able to produce HQ products when it is not possible when the economy is characterized by a 
homogeneous production structure. 
However, the third term of the RHS of condition (7) implies that the expansion of HQ 
production – once it exists – proceeds more gradually when there is a heterogeneous 
distribution of farms. To see this, define 2 kB M Nγ φ= . The third term then equals 
1 (1 )B+ , which is less than 1 with 0B > . Formally, *
1H
MX I
B
∂ ∂ =
+
. With 0B =  when 
0kγ = , and 0kB γ∂ ∂ > , it follows that the growth in 
*
HX  with increasing income will be 
more gradual when there is a more heterogeneous set of producers – given that * 0HX > . 
These results are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
In Figure 2.1 ( )0SH kX γ =  represents the supply function for homogeneous producers 
and ( )0SH kX γ >  the supply function for heterogeneous producers. For low income, 
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represented by demand function 1
D
HQ  for high standards products, the equilibrium output in 
the high standards market is zero with homogeneously distributed producers, i.e. 
( )* 1 0 0H kX γ = = . In contrast, under a heterogeneous producer structure, the HQE does 
emerge and the equilibrium is at point A. HQ output is equal to ( )* 1 0H kX γ > . For increasing 
higher income levels, represented by demand curves 2
D
HQ  and 3
D
HQ , the market equilibrium 
with the heterogeneous structure shifts to points B and C, respectively. For the homogeneous 
production structure, there will also be positive HQ output at 2
D
HQ  and 3
D
HQ , represented by 
points D and E, respectively. 
Figure 2.1 thus illustrates that HQ production emerges at lower levels of income for 
heterogeneous structure (represented by point A). However, once the HQ emerges in an 
economy characterized by a more homogeneous structure, the growth of HQE is more rapid 
as income grows. When examining Figure 2.1, note that the growth of production is 
represented by the shift from point D to E is larger than for the shift from B to C. 
These results are further illustrated in Figure 2.2. When income is too low 
kkI τ γ
φ
 + −
< 
 
 as illustrated by point G, there is no HQE under either the heterogeneous or 
homogeneous structure. As income increases, however, the HQE emerges first in the 
economy characterized by a heterogeneous production structure for kkI τ γ
φ
+ −
> , shown by 
point A. Under the assumption that a nation’s production structure is more homogeneous, the 
minimum income requirement for the emergence of a HQE is higher kI τ
φ
 +
> 
 
. When 
income is low kk kIτ γ τ
φ φ
 + − +
< < 
 
, a HQE exists under the heterogeneous structure  
(point A), but does not (yet) exist under the homogeneous structure (point F). At higher 
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Figure 2.2 Size of the HQE under Different Production Structures 
 
incomes, HQ production is also positive for the homogeneous structure, but output remains 
higher for heterogeneous production structure, as long as income does not reach the level 
2
k NI
M
τ
φ
+
= +  (Point H). At higher incomes, the homogeneous producer structure produces 
higher output. Finally, when income is larger than k N
M
τ
φ
+
+  but lower than kk N
M
τ γ
φ
+ +
+ , 
the HQE will include all producers under the homogeneous structure in contrast to the 
heterogeneous structure, shown respectively by points K and J.  
This approach also allows to analyze who is included in the HQE. With a 
heterogeneous production structure, the most productive farms will start producing HQ at 
low income levels. However, given the same set of incomes and other factors, the less 
productive farms will be excluded. When the production structure of an economy is more 
homogeneous, HQ production will only start at higher income levels. Although beginning 
later in the development process, once started the process will be more inclusive. More 
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producers will be included. This insight can be seen graphically in Figure 2.3. The line that 
divides the graph between the LQE and the HQE is characterized by kk γ τ
φ
− + , which is the 
minimum income level required for a HQE to emerge under given producer heterogeneity 
kγ . It illustrates again that when producers are more heterogeneous, there is a more rapid 
emergence of the HQE—given certain levels of income growth. In addition, under our 
assumption that more productive producers have lower capital costs jk , Figure 2.3 also 
illustrates that when income increases, a homogeneous producer structure is more inclusive 
towards low productivity producers. At high levels of income, all producers will be included 
under any distribution. 
Figure 2.3 Combined Impact of Production Structure and Income on HQE 
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2.4. Transaction Costs 
The nature of transaction costs is another fundamental feature of an economy that can 
affect the HQE. First, transaction costs will affect the overall size of HQ production. Higher 
transaction costs constrain the size of the HQE (
*
0HX M
τ φ
∂
= − <
∂
, see equation (5)). It makes 
sourcing from suppliers more costly and therefore increases the relative cost of the HQ 
products. 
Second, transaction costs will also affect who is included. In the literature, a standard 
argument is that there are fixed transaction costs per supplier for processors (Reardon et al., 
2009). This implies that transaction costs per unit of output are lower for large producers and 
hence small producers will be excluded. However, such conclusion is overly simplistic and 
depends on the specific (often implicit) assumptions on the nature of the transaction costs. In 
reality there are different types of transaction costs that might be important when processors 
source HQ commodities from producers. Transaction costs may or may not be related to 
producers’ productivity. For example, one common type of transaction costs might include 
costs of search (by company procurement agents that are looking for producers that are 
willing to supply to the HQE), supervision costs, quality and process control costs and the 
costs of enforcement of agreements (Key and Runsten, 1999). Supervision costs and quality 
control costs may depend on productivity of producers while search costs and enforcement 
costs have no clear relationship with producers’ productivity. As an illustration, consider the 
following example from Minten et al. (2009), which studies processor-farmer interactions in 
a HQ vegetable production region which produce horticultural exports in Madagascar for the 
European Union: 
‘To monitor the correct implementation of the [HQ] conditions, the [processor] has 
…around 300 extension agents who are permanently on the payroll of the company. 
Every extension agent … is responsible for about thirty farmers. To supervise these, 
(s)he coordinates [another] five or six extension assistants ... that live in the village 
itself. … During the cultivation period of the [HQ] vegetables, the [farmer] is visited 
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on average more than once (1.3 times) a week …to ensure correct production 
management as well as to avoid ‘side-selling’. …99% of the farmers say that the firm 
knows the exact location of the plot; 92% of the farmers say that the firm even knows 
…the number of plants on the plot. 
‘For some crucial aspects of the production process, representatives of the company 
will even intervene in the production management to ensure it is rightly done.’ (p. 
1733). 
This example clearly illustrates that the notion of fixed transaction costs per supplier 
is not (necessarily) consistent with reality. For conceptual purposes, one could distinguish 
three types of transaction costs: those which are fixed per supplier (e.g. contract negotiation 
costs), those which are fixed per unit of output (e.g. output control costs) and those which are 
fixed per unit of production input (e.g. monitoring of plots and production activities). 
To show that these different types of transaction costs will have different effects in 
the emergence, size and composition of the HQE, we compare two types of transaction costs: 
on the one hand transaction costs which are fixed per supplier and on the other hand 
transaction costs which are fixed per unit of input. Note that if we would fix transaction costs 
per supplier, this would be equivalent to transaction costs which are fixed per unit of output, 
as our model assumes identical output levels across producers. More specifically, we assume 
that jτ  is a producer (supplier) -specific transaction cost. It is uniformly distributed over the 
interval [ ],τ ττ γ τ γ− +  with [ ]0,τγ τ∈  and 0τ ≥ . With transaction costs defined in this way, 
we first consider the case when transaction costs are fixed per producer. This means that 
transaction costs are identical for all producers (or, 0τγ =  and jτ τ= ). In the second case, 
we consider transaction costs which are fixed per unit of input. This implies that transaction 
costs are negatively related to producer productivity, i.e. 0j jkτ∂ ∂ > , which implies 0τγ > . 
It is immediately clear that these different types of transaction costs will have 
fundamentally different implications for which producers will be included in the HQE. In 
one case, the transaction costs will be ‘neutral’ regarding productivity heterogeneity; in the 
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other case, they will reinforce the productivity-bias. Formally this can be seen from the new 
condition for the equilibrium output of HQ products with producer specific transaction costs: 
(8) ( ) ( )
( )
* 1
1
2
k
H
k
k
X M I M
N
τ
τ
γ τ γ
φφ
γ γ
 − + −  = −   
  +  + 
. 
It follows from equation (8) that the structure with heterogeneous transaction costs, 
i.e. 0τγ ≠ , will induce earlier emergence of HQE for increasing income levels. The HQE 
arises when kkI ττ γ γ
φ
+ − −
> , which is less restrictive for higher τγ  (more heterogeneity in 
transaction costs). 
Figure 2.4 illustrates this effect. The HQ supply function with fixed transaction costs  
Figure 2.4 HQ Production under Different Types of Transaction Costs  
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( )0τγ =  per supplier is identical to that of Figure 2.1 with heterogeneous suppliers. 16
1
D
HQ
 It 
follows from equation (8) that with heterogeneous transaction costs, the HQ supply function 
pivots around point H. This implies more HQ supply at lower levels of income (represented 
by ) but less supply at higher levels of income. As is illustrated in Figure 2.4, the 
negative relation of transaction costs with productivity reinforces the productivity effect in 
this pivot of the supply function. 
The impact - on who gets included when the nature of transaction costs is taken into 
account - is also analogous to the discussion over the production structure of the economy. 
Low productive suppliers will be less likely included with transaction costs fixed per unit of 
input, and vice versa. In this way, transaction costs reinforce the productivity effect, in the 
sense that they reduce the purchasing costs for processors from more productive farms. 
Farms with higher productivity will have even more cost advantages because the per unit 
transaction costs are lower. However, this result depends on the nature of ‘transaction costs’. 
If fixed transaction costs are per farm, this is not the case. 
Notice that one should be careful in interpreting these findings. Our specific findings 
are conditional on our model specification, which assumes there is a fixed output per farm. 
However, our main result, i.e. that the impact on the inclusion in the HQE depends on the 
nature of the transaction costs, holds in general. In reality, some transaction costs are fixed 
per farm, such as those for bargaining and search. Other costs however, such as product or 
process control costs, would at least have a component that is better modelled as per unit of 
output or input cost. To the extent that these variable transaction costs are more important, 
the cost advantage of large and more productive farms will change. Another issue is the 
                                                 
16 Note that in case of homogeneous suppliers, there is no effect of the nature of the transaction costs on who get 
included since all suppliers (and thus their transaction costs) are identical. 
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distribution of the profit due to low transaction costs. Generally, it depends on the 
contribution and bargaining power of the involved players (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2007). 
 
2.5. Contracting 
In developing countries, processing firms or large traders are often less capital 
constrained than producers. As a consequence of this asymmetric capital market 
imperfection, processors and producers may start a process of vertical coordination or 
contracting by which the processors supply the producers with the capital necessary to 
produce the high quality product. This is consistent with empirical observations that the 
introduction of higher quality requirements in transition and developing countries has 
coincided with the growth of contracting (Swinnen, 2007). Empirical studies show that local 
producers in developing countries are engaging in complex contracting with processors 
selling into high quality markets. These contracts not only specify conditions for delivery and 
production processes but also include the provision of inputs, credit, technology, management 
advice etc. (Minten et al., 2009; World Bank, 2005b). The latter are particularly important for 
local producers who face important local factor market imperfections. If the institutional 
environment is such that producers and processors have the possibility to contract the 
production of high quality products, this may have important implications for the emergence, 
growth, size, and inclusivity of the HQE. 
To analyze the impact of contracting in our HQE framework, we use a simplified 
version of the contract model that is typically used to study these problems.17
k
 Different from 
the basic model, we assume that, due to the imperfect credit market, each producer can have a 
maximum amount of capital ( ), either self-owned or borrowed. 
                                                 
17 See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) for an extensive analysis of such models and the impact of competition 
and imperfect enforcement on (the efficiency of) contracting between processors and producers. 
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When processors contract with producers, we assume that processors can provide an 
individual maximum capital pk  to producers to produce the high quality product. Producers 
will participate in this type of contracting if the producers’ capital cost jk  is larger than the 
producer’s capital constraint but lower than the total capital after getting capital from 
processors. 
As before, we assume that the individual capital cost jk  differs among producers and 
is uniformly distributed, but for simplicity we assume identical transaction costs τ  (i.e. 
transaction costs are fixed per producer).  
The indifferent capital cost between producing for the HQE and the LQE can be 
derived from combining equations (2) and (6) with H LP c k τ= + +  and L LP c= : 
(9) 
1 1 1
kkIk
B B
γφ τ −−
= +
+ +
 , 
with 2 kMB
N
γ
φ
=  as before. This assumption means that the economy cannot arrive at the 
equilibrium point W in Figure 2.5 without extra capital input. 
Whether contracting has an impact on the market equilibrium in the HQE depends on 
whether k k≥   or k k<  . First, consider the situation where k k≥  . In this case the possibility 
of contracting does not impact on the HQE as contracting will not occur. All producers with 
jk k≤   participate in the HQE. And as k k≥  , no producer involved in the HQE needs to 
contract with a processor.  
Second, when pk k k k< + <  , contracting does have an impact on the emergence, size, 
and inclusivity of the HQE. In Figure 2.5, the equilibrium without contracting is depicted by 
point Y and the contracting equilibrium by Z, where * 'cHX  is the equilibrium HQ output under 
contracting. Conditional on pk k k+ <  , the equilibrium HQ output under contracting is  
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Figure 2.5 Impact of Contracting on the HQE Equilibrium 
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which is larger than the equilibrium HQ output without contracting 
  
( )*
2
kc
H
k
N k k
X
γ
γ
+ −
= . 
Straightforwardly, contracting will have an impact on the emergence of the HQE 
when k pk k k kγ< − < +  and kk kγ− < . 
Therefore, contracting has impacts on HQE. First, the HQE will be larger with the 
possibility of contracting, i.e. * *'c cH HX X> , which is clear in Figure 2.5. By relaxing capital 
                                                 
18 If k k k k p< < + , the equilibrium HQ output under contracting is 
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constraints of producers with jk k> , contracting enlarges the set of producers who are able 
to produce the high quality product at a given equilibrium price. Second, contracting between 
processors and producers induces the HQE to become more inclusive towards less productive 
producers. 
In conclusion, if processors can relax credit constraints of producers, contracting will 
improve the size, growth, and inclusivity of the HQE, and in extreme cases it may even lead 
to an earlier emergence of the HQE. This linkage between the capital constraint, contracting, 
and the emergence of the HQE offers an explanation for the empirical observation foreign 
direct investment (FDI) play an important role in the emergence of HQEs (e.g. Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004). Processors have developed VC arrangements with supplying farms to 
provide capital inputs to farms who are capital constrained, either because of the collapse of 
the financial system (e.g., in transition countries – see Gow and Swinnen, 1998; World Bank, 
2005a) or because of general credit constraints of farmers in developing countries (e.g., 
Minten et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). To set up such VC arrangements, 
processors themselves need sufficient access to capital. This is why FDI – or other 
institutional arrangements which enhance the access of processors to capital markets have 
played an important role. While FDI may have more than one effect on the emergence of a 
HQE, a crucial element is that, with capital market imperfections in developing countries, 
foreign companies frequently face less restrictive credit constraints than domestic companies 
in developing countries. Because of this, foreign firms may therefore be able to invest when it 
is not possible for domestic companies to do so.19
                                                 
19 In some cases, access to capital has also come from (domestic) company investments which have other 
sources of capital (such as the case of Russia in which there are energy firms that are willing to invest in 
domestic firms) or through supply contracts with international traders (as in cotton markets in Central Asia – 
Swinnen, 2007). 
 Through VC this, in turn, leads to reduced 
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capital constraints for farmers with FDI. Section 2.5 clearly showed the beneficial impact of 
contracting on the emergence of the HQE in line with the empirical observations. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have developed a formal theory of the process of the endogenous 
introduction of high quality products in developing countries. We use our theoretical model 
to analyze how different structural conditions of the economy affect the emergence and size 
of the high quality economy (HQE). Differences in the form of the level of income, the 
relative cost of capital, the extent and nature of transaction costs and whether the production 
structure is homogeneous or heterogeneous will affect the timing of the emergence and the 
size of the HQE. These results can be used to gain insights on how institutional reforms, 
including macro-economic stabilization, liberalization of trade and foreign investment 
regulations can have important impacts on the growth of the HQE. In particular, these and 
any other policy change that reduces the cost of capital, according to our model, will play an 
important role in stimulating the growth of the HQE.  
We also examine which factors affect who is able to participate in the HQE as it is 
emerging. Not surprisingly, we find that the most productive farms switch first to producing 
for the HQ market. Importantly, our analysis shows how the nature of the initial production 
structure can affect both the size and distributional effects of the HQE. In countries with a 
mixed production structure, combining large and medium size commercial farms with small-
scale household farms, such as in Latin America and parts of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, the process is more likely to lead to an initial exclusion of smallholders from 
the HQE. In contrast, in countries such as China and Vietnam, India and parts of Africa, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where the farm sector is more uniform and dominated by 
30                                                                                                                                                       Chapter 2 
 
small farms, the emergence of the HQE, although delayed, can be expected to be more 
inclusive. 
Transaction costs also play an important role as they may or may not reinforce the 
disadvantaged position of less productive producers – depending on the nature of the 
transaction costs. Reducing these transaction costs, for example by investments in 
infrastructure, producer associations, third party quality control and monitoring institutions, 
could also play a role in reducing the bias against small and less efficient producers and 
speed their integration into the HQE. 
Additionally, we show that contracting between producers and processors may induce 
the HQE to be more inclusive towards less efficient producers through increased access to 
capital. We also explain how foreign direct investment may play an important role in this 
way. 
Therefore, similar to the empirical literature, our model shows that less productive 
farms are excluded from modern supply chains, that less productive farms face more intense 
pressure than more productive farms, and that vertical coordination (contracting) allows 
some less productive farms to be included in modern supply chains. 
While this chapter is the first attempt to model the introduction of HQ products in 
developing countries, we realize that our analysis is only the first step. Several issues in this 
process require more analysis. First, the farm heterogeneity issue and its relation with the 
HQE which has been the subject of extensive empirical analysis and debate, requires more 
extensive analysis. Second, the interactions between the processors and the producers in the 
HQE are either modelled as spot market transactions or as simple contracts in which 
processors provide producers with capital at a lower cost. However, there is substantial 
empirical evidence that this relationship is often more complicated, taking the form of 
complex contracts or other forms of vertical integration. These different governance forms 
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that are observed in the HQ supply chain will affect both the emergence and size of the HQ 
chain.  
While policies and institutions are not explicitly in our model, they do affect the 
equilibrium indirectly through their effect on the various factors which we have discussed. A 
few examples may indicate how an extended version of our model could be used to capture 
such policy effects. For example, if foreign investment rules were liberalized, they could 
stimulate the HQE through their effect on the inflow of FDI and reduced capital constraints 
for producers. Public investments in infrastructure and institutions that promote quality 
control and food safety institutions could stimulate the HQE by reducing transaction costs in 
the HQ market. Economic and institutional reforms could also have non-linear dynamic 
effects on the HQE if they initially increase the cost of capital because of disruptions (as they 
did during the early years of the transition in Eastern Europe). In the longer run, however, 
institutional reform reduces the cost of capital as the more efficient, post-liberalization 
economic system develops. More generally, policies which affect macro-economic 
uncertainty and the security of property rights for investors are likely to affect the emergence 
and size of the HQE through their effects on the cost of capital for producers, either directly 
or through the profitability of VC arrangements. 
Finally, to further complete the analysis one should also look at the interaction with 
labor markets. HQ investments will affect labor markets as the new investments create off-
farm employment both inside the processing facility, as well as in the service sector (e.g., in 
the areas of extension, packaging, supervision, controlling, marketing and transport). Some – 
or most – of these jobs are low skilled and may be taken by the poorest of the poor. 
Empirical studies indicate that if HQ production takes place through vertically integrated 
company-owned farms, this may have different effects on rural households than when they 
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can start producing HQ commodities themselves (see e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Maertens et al., 2008).   
In summary, all these factors should be considered when attempting to analyze the 
effect of the emergence of HQ markets on households in developing and transition countries. 
These combined effects are likely to be complex. These and other issues should be the focus 
of future research and we hope that such models can build upon the theoretical framework 
that is developed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Food Standards and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Model with Market 
Imperfections20
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
A series of recent studies have identified the spread of ‘high standards’ as having a 
fundamental impact on the process of development (Farina and Reardon, 2000; Fulponi, 
2007; Henson et al., 2000; McCluskey, 2007; Reardon et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2007). The 
growing demand of wealthy consumers for high quality, safety, health, and ethical standards 
put pressure on governments to increase public regulatory standards and on private 
processing and retailing companies to introduce or tighten private corporate standards 
(Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008). Generally, growing demand for high standards is a 
natural consequence of income growth (Vandemoortele et al., 2009). In recent years it has 
been reinforced by several additional events. For example, international campaigns against 
child labor and genetically modified food, NGO activities for the environment and several 
food safety crises, such as the food dioxin crisis and the appearance of BSE in Europe, have 
all contributed to a rising demand for high quality, safe and traceable products in the 
production chains of many nations.21
Although high standards emerged initially in rich countries, they now affect poorer 
countries through several channels. First, standards in richer countries are also imposed on 
imports and consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting nations 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Unnevehr, 2000). Second, global supply chains are playing an 
 
                                                 
20 This chapter is based on joint research with Jikun Huang, d’Artis Kancs, Scott Rozelle and Jo Swinnen (See 
Xiang et al. (2010)). 
21 This chapter focuses on the development implications of changes in the demand for high quality products  
There are several related areas in the literature on product quality standards, including a) analyses of 
asymmetric information problems which may be one of the reasons for companies or public regulators to 
introduce standards (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Gardner, 2003; Leland, 1979); b) studies on the role of 
standards in reducing consumption externalities (Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Copeland and Taylor, 1995); c) the 
role of standards in providing non-tariff trade protection (Anderson et al., 2004; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Otsuki 
et al., 2001); and d) the political economy of standards  (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008). 
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increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these vertically 
coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing standards (Swinnen, 2007). For 
example, modern retailing companies increasingly dominate international and local markets 
in fruits and meats, including those in poorer countries, and have begun to set standards for 
food quality and safety in this sector wherever they are doing business (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Henson et al., 2000). Third, rising investment in processing and retailing in 
developing countries is translated into higher standards, as buyers are making new demands 
on local producers in order to serve the high-end income consumers or to minimize 
transaction costs in supply chains (Reardon et al., 2003).  
Early studies argued that the penetration of international marketing chains was much 
more widespread than people originally thought (e.g., Gulati et al., 2007; World Bank, 2005) 
and predicted that the implications of these developments would be vast: a new development 
paradigm was emerging (Reardon and Timmer, 2005). 
Importantly, the early literature also posited that the rise of standards could have sharp 
negative influences on equity and poverty. Several of the studies argued that modern supply 
chains in developing countries systematically exclude the poor and negatively affect the 
incomes of small farmers; unlike other waves of rising economic activity, the poor would 
suffer from this process (Farina and Reardon, 2000). For example, studies in Latin America 
and Africa argued that small farmers were being left behind in the supermarket-driven 
horticultural marketing and trade (Dolan and Humphrey, 2001; Humphrey et al., 2004; Key 
and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001). In a study on Kenya, 
Minot and Ngigi (2004) demonstrated that modern marketing chains put intense pressure on 
smallholders (although smallholders were still participating). Even more extreme, in the case 
of Côte d’Ivoire, almost all of the fruits and vegetables being produced for exports were 
being cultivated on large industrial estates owned by wealthy capitalists. Likewise, 
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Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) reported that the rise of supermarkets in Southern Africa 
failed to help small producers who were almost completely excluded from dynamic urban 
markets due to quality and safety standards.    
In contrast, recent research suggests a more nuanced picture of the effect of the 
international marketing chains on poverty and development. For example, Dries and Swinnen 
(2004) and Dries et al. (2009) find that high standards lead to increased vertical coordination 
in supply chains which improves access to credit, technology and quality inputs for poor 
farmers in Eastern Europe. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and Minten et al. (2009) also find 
increased vertical coordination in newly emerging supply chains between buyers and farms in 
African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal. According to their results, poor rural 
households experienced measurable gains from supplying high standards horticulture 
commodities to global retail chains. In China, researchers find that while rising urban 
incomes and the emergence of a relatively wealthy middle class are associated with an 
enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vegetables and sharp shifts in the downstream 
segment of the food chain towards ‘modern retailing’, almost all of the increased supply is 
being produced by small, relatively poor farmers that sell to small, relatively poor traders. 
(Huang et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009) 
An important shortcoming of this literature – in addition to empirical problems – is 
the absence of a consistent and comprehensive conceptual framework for interpreting the 
empirical findings. Related to this, very few of the empirical studies actually measure welfare 
or poverty effects. The vast majority of these studies analyze which farmers are supplying to 
the high standards market and/or the impacts on productivity or investments of supplying 
farms. The only studies that actually examine poverty effect are Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) and Maertens et al. (2008). They find strong poverty reducing effects of high 
standards exports in Senegal. In addition, they show that much of the welfare benefits for the 
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poor come through the labor market, which is ignored by most other studies. Moreover, no 
studies analyze other general equilibrium effects such as spillover effects on other markets. 
The demand for integrating several markets into a single model leads to the use of 
general equilibrium as the most suitable tool (See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995, for a 
comparison between general and partial equilibrium.). The objective of this chapter is 
therefore to model the process through which high standards production and consumption 
affect development while explicitly taking into account general equilibrium effects and 
market imperfections. The model has both a low standards and high standards supply chain 
and we explicitly integrate key characteristics of many developing and emerging economies, 
such as capital constrains and labor market imperfections. We use the model to analyze how 
and through which channels welfare of rural and urban households is affected. 
Because of many general equilibrium interactions the model is too complex to solve 
analytically. Therefore we use a computable general equilibrium model22
                                                 
22 As Shoven and Whalley (1992) have stated that ‘The value of these computational general equilibrium 
models is that numerical simulations removes the need to work in small dimensions, and much more detail and 
complexity can be incorporated than in simple analytic models.’ Of course, this merit does not come without 
costs. For example, CGE models are sensitive to certain major assumptions, to the choice of key parameter 
values, and to the calibration of the initial equilibrium data set (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). It is not our 
intention in the paper to predict the size of the impacts of high standards food, but rather show the mechanisms 
through which the expansion of the high standards food sector takes place and how it affects welfare, and which 
factors are crucially important to take into account. Considering the trade-off between complexities of out 
research questions and reliability of alternative methodologies, we think that CGE modeling is acceptable for 
our objective. 
 and simulations to 
show the effects. For this, we calibrate the model with data from China. The development of 
high standards food sector in China is particularly relevant for three reasons. First, even 
though China has sustained high growth rates for nearly thirty years and the continuously 
increasing income per capita leads to structural change of Chinese diet (Gale and Huang, 
2007), the food distribution system remained laggard until very recently. However, recent 
years are characterized by the fast rising supermarkets and some food safety scandals (Hu et 
al., 2004; Wang et al., 2009). Yet the transition from a system occupied mainly by low 
standards food produced by millions of small farms (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) to one 
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mainly by high standards food is only now starting and will undoubtedly have huge impact 
on both producers and consumers. Second, despite high growth rates, an increasing inequality 
between wealthy and poor households becomes a more and more acute issue (Ravallion, 
2001). After the initially fast decrease of poverty rate, in the last decade China faces more 
difficulties in reducing the rural poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2007; Riskin, 2004). 90% of 
poverty is still rural in China (World Bank, 2009). The welfare and poverty effects associated 
with the expansion of high standards food sector are therefore potentially very important. 
Third, in China, primary agriculture alone accounts for 12.5% of GDP in 2005 (CNBS, 
2006), whilst the inclusion of food processing activities may push that statistic closer to 20%. 
Equally, Chinese primary agriculture employs around 44.8% of the workforce in 2005  
(CNBS, 2006). Consequently, any ‘shocks’ which impact on the downstream food processing 
sectors have secondary economy-wide impacts. Fourth, both the agricultural commodity and 
factor markets are under transition. Whereas the commodity market is becoming more and 
more efficient (Huang and Rozelle, 2006), factor markets imperfections remain important. 
Therefore, China provides a very interesting case for research on the interaction between the 
food system transition and the acute equity and poverty problem under conditions of market 
imperfections. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Framework 
As discussed in the introduction, the findings of the previous literature suggest that 
the expansion of the high standards food affects the GDP growth and income distribution 
through various channels. Although, by focusing on a particular channel provides detailed 
insights of that particular channel, the partial equilibrium approach, which dominates the 
previous literature on food standards, has important drawbacks for interpreting the results and 
for drawing policy conclusions. In particular, it is essential to measure and integrate the 
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impact on other commodity markets and on factor markets in order to fully capture the 
welfare effects. 
In order to address the limitations associated with the partial equilibrium framework, 
the present chapter adopts a general equilibrium setting for studying the impacts of the 
expansion of the high standards food on household welfare. Our model follows the tradition 
of applied general equilibrium models pioneered by Shoven and Whalley (1992), although its 
precise specification is more closely allied to the CGE models described in de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2002) and Stifel and Thorbecke (2003). 
 
3.2.1. A Canonical Model 
The structure of this type of models is as follows. The economy consists of N 
households indexed by c, M commodities indexed by m and J factors indexed by j. Let P be a 
vector of prices. The commodity demands can be derived from the first order conditions of 
household utility-maximization: 
(11) max   s.t. c c cm jU p X p V=∑ ∑                          
where cU  is household utility, cX  and cV  denote commodity demand and factor endowment 
for the cth household, mp  and jp  are the corresponding commodity and factor prices. 
Household demand for consumption goods is a function of their disposable income 
and the vector of consumer prices. Household incomes are determined by their ownership of 
production factors and returns to the production factors. 
All the production technologies are typically based on nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) functions with possible sub-nests in the form of CES or Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) functions.23
                                                 
23 CES and CD functions are used interchangeably in the literature to cater to research objectives and demand 
for data (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). And since rural and urban labor are nearly not substitutable, specifying 
technologies as Cobb-Douglas is reasonable in light of their characteristic zero cross-price elasticities of demand 
 The intermediate sectors produce goods according to a CES function of the 
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rural labor, land and capital. Final food sectors produce goods by using a CES function to 
combine their respective intermediate products and the bundle of the basic factors (other than 
intermediate inputs), aggregated through a CES function with a sub-nest of a CES or CD 
function for the two types of labor. The gross output of the other commodities sector is a CES 
function with a sub-nest of a CES or CD function for labor. 
Profit maximization behaviour yields factor demands 
(12)                       ( , )m m mj j jV V p Q=                                      
The economy is connected to the rest of the world through trade. The substitutability 
between imported and domestic goods is determined on the consumption side through a CES 
aggregation function (Armington substitution function), and on the production side through a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. The relative prices of foreign goods are 
determined by world market prices and the exchange rate. 
In order to model savings and investment, the following three assumptions are used: 
(1) savings are determined by exogenous constant rates for households; (2) private 
investment is savings driven; and (3) investment spending is allocated to commodities in 
fixed proportions.24
The total demand and supply of factors, goods and intermediate products must be 
equal in equilibrium. A general equilibrium for this model is given by a set of prices 
 For simplicity and data paucity, we further assume that only the final 
commodities are used as investment goods, while intermediate commodities not. Total 
savings equal total investments. 
*p  and 
activity levels *X  such that demands equal supplies and no production activity makes 
positive profits 
                                                                                                                                                        
for inputs (Stifel and Thorbecke, 2003). Furthermore, if we assume CES technology for these two kinds of 
labor, it is difficult to determine the elasticity of substitution between them since there is few literature on this. 
Hence, we regard this assumption as acceptable considering both the reality and simplicity. 
24 Following Dewatripont and Michel (1987), this neoclassical closure is the most common one in comparative 
static CGE models and widely used in the literature (e.g., de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002). 
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(13)                       m cmQ X=∑                                           
(14)                       ( , , ) 0m m m jQ p p∏ =                                   
The market for foreign exchange equilibrates via adjustments of the net export, with 
fixed trade surplus. Pressures to adjust export or import quantities (and hence, demand and 
supply of foreign currency) are therefore equilibrated by adjustments in the foreign exchange 
rates.25
The aggregate consumer price index (CPI) and the aggregate producer price index 
(PPI) are defined as sum of composite prices (
 
mPQ ) weighted by the value shares of final 
goods ( mν ) and the sum of producer prices ( mPI ) weighted by the value shares of output 
( mµ ), respectively. 
(15)                            *m m
m
CPI PQν=∑                                        
(16)                            *m m
m
PPI PIµ=∑                                         
The nominal exchange rate is used as a numeraire (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002). 
This ensures that only the relative prices matter.26
Household welfare (
 
cW ) is measured by real income, which is nominal income ( cY ) 
normalized by a household-specific price index ( cP ): 
(17)                              
c
c
c
YW
P
=                                                          
To measure inequality a Gini coefficient can be calculated through the trapezium 
rule:27
                                                 
25 This assumption has no important impact on results. In fact, if savings do not enter households’ utility 
function, then fixing either the exchange rate or the trade balance is the same right approach for welfare 
analysis, since it prevents an arbitrary shift away from savings towards current consumption from being 
confused with a welfare improvement. And in our model, we will fix the exchange rate as numeraire so that our 
modelling is compatible to the case of China, where exchange rates are not quite flexible. 
 
26 As stated by de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002), the choice of numeraire has no impact on real income effects, but 
has impact on decomposition of real income effects, which should be born in mind to explain the simulation 
results. 
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(18)               1 1
1
1 ( )*( ),
n
c c c c
c
G N N Y Y c C− −
=
= − − − ∈∑                        
where cN  and cY are the cumulated proportions of population and income respectively. 
 
3.2.2. Extensions to Include Market Imperfections in the 
Literature 
The first seminal paper on CGE with imperfect competition is Harris (1984), which 
introduces the concepts of imperfect competition, economies of scale, and entry and exit, etc. 
into the empirical research field of applied general equilibrium models and checks whether 
these concepts have some different impacts from models with perfect competition based on 
the same dataset. He finds that the results are significantly different and hence proved the 
importance of taking account into imperfect competition in CGE models. 
After him, a lot of papers also build similar CGE models to check whether imperfect 
competition shows some difference from perfect competition (e.g., Devarajan and Rodrik, 
1989; Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997). Willenbockel (2004) checks the robustness of 
different specifications and get the result that ‘simulation results are generally far more 
sensitive to numerical specification choices at the calibration stage, than to the prior choice of 
firm conduct specification’. To apply these models suitably, others also check whether there 
is unique solution under such assumptions (Mercenier, 1995). 
All the above models are trying to analyze the effects of trade liberalization based on 
the conjecture that trade liberalization is pro-competitive which can’t be captured by the 
models with perfect competition. Hence their policy simulations focus on reduction of tariff 
or remove of non-tariff barriers. Konan and van Assche (2007) have a more innovative 
                                                                                                                                                        
27 For this we make use of the trapezium rule which is an approximate technique for calculating the definite 
integral of Gini coefficient. In our case, the trapezium rule is applicable since the income distribution of 
representative households is not continuous (Cruz-Uribe and Neugebauer, 2002). 
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strategy. To estimate the impact of telecom liberalization in Tunisia, they just analyze the 
effect of allowing a single foreign provider to enter Tunisia's telecom market. 
To account for firm heterogeneity and following Melitz’s (2003) theoretic innovation, 
Zhai (2008) integrates firm heterogeneity into CGE models and finds that model results are 
sensitive to parameters of firm productivity distribution. His model is also rich in including 
continuous distribution of product varieties. 
Even though there is already a vast literature on CGE models with market 
imperfections, the application of this kind of models to agriculture is limited. Since 
agricultural sector is full of market imperfections (de Janvry et al., 1993), a CGE model with 
market imperfections is suitable to explain the paradoxes in this field. 
 
3.2.3. Integrating Standards and Market Imperfections 
In order to incorporate the key features of food standards and their linkages to the rest 
of the economy, we extend the canonical CGE model along several dimensions. First, given 
that differentiated goods are important for studying the impact of standard expansion, we 
extend the canonical CGE model by introducing two types of vertically differentiated goods 
in the food sector (Vandemoortele et al., 2009):28
                                                 
28 The same extensions can be straightforwardly implemented also to other sectors. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, these extensions are not presented here. 
 low standards food and high standards 
food. Second, to allow for differential effects among rural households we explicitly model 
heterogeneity of farmers (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002). Third, in order to study the impact 
of rural credit market imperfections, which are very important in many developing countries, 
we introduce credit constraint for rural households, different from Harris (1984) which 
assumes monopolistic competition. Finally, in order to trace rural-urban effects of the high 
standards food expansion, an inter-regional CGE approach of Kilkenny (1993), Ando and 
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Takanori (1997), and Kancs (2001) is adopted with labor market imperfections. Figure 3.1 
and Table A3.1 summarize the model structure. 
Accounting for the dual farm structure characteristic to many developing countries, 
there are two types of rural producers in the model: households (C) (which will be further 
separated in different groups in the calibration and simulations) and corporate farms (CF).29
LR
 
On the consumer side, in order to study the distributional consequences of standards, we 
distinguish between urban and rural households, and rural households are further 
disaggregated into several income groups. There are four types of factor inputs: rural labor 
( ), urban labor ( LU ), capital ( K ) and land ( A ), with rural households (CR) owning three 
types of them: rural labor, land and capital, while urban households (CU) owning urban labor 
and capital. The detailed modeling of different types of rural producers and consumers allows 
us to decompose the aggregate income effects of the high standards food expansion, which 
are crucial for policy recommendations 
Five commodities are produced in the economy, three of which are final goods: low 
standards food (LF) and high standards food (HF) and other commodities (O).30
                                                 
29 To avoid confusion between notations for households and high standards, we use capital ‘C’ and ‘H’ to 
indicate households and high standards respectively. Later, to differentiate with activity set, noted as ‘I’, we use 
‘O’ as the notation for the industrial sector. We use ‘LF’/‘HF’ and ‘L’/‘H’ for low/high standards final food and 
low/high standards intermediate products respectively. 
 There are 
two types of agricultural intermediate products: low standards (L) and high standards (H), 
which are located in the rural areas and exclusively used by their respective food processing 
sectors, which take place in both the rural and urban areas, to produce the respective final 
food. Given that the main focus of the chapter is on food standards, we do not include
30  The underlying model is not limited to the selected five sectors, it can be straightforwardly expanded to n 
sectors. However, given that they would add little insights to our question, while unnecessary complicating the 
analysis, the rest of the economic activities are aggregated into one sector ‘other commodities’. 
  
Figure 3.1 Model Structure 
 
Households 
Rural household (CR) 
Endow.: Rural labour,  Land , Capital (LR, A, K) 
Low standards 
inter.: 
fL(LR,A,K) 
Zero profit 
Rural household (CR): 
High standards inter.: 
fHRC(LR,A,K) 
Positive profit 
Low standards food market High standards food market 
High standards processing: 
fHF(LR,LU,A,K,QXH) 
Zero profit 
Other commodities market 
Urban Household (CU) 
Endow.: Urban labour;  Capital (LU,  K) 
Other commodities 
production 
fO(LR,LU, K) 
Zero profit 
ROW high standard food market ROW other commodities market 
Factor flows Commodity flows Intermediate flows 
ROW low standard food market 
Activities 
Domestic 
markets 
Foreign 
markets 
Corporate farm (CF): 
High standards inter.: 
fHCF(LR,A,K) 
Positive profit 
Low standards processing: 
fLF(LR,LU,A,K,QXL) 
Zero profit 
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intermediate goods in other sectors.31
We assume that high standards food is a luxury good compared to low standards food 
products. Accordingly, household consumption is modelled by the following system:
 
32, 33
                 
 
(1 ) ,
c c c
c c cHF
HF LF
LF
a mps YX a c C
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−
= − ∈
                      
(19)                 
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c c c
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LF LF
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subject to the household budget constraint: 
                
(1 ) ,c c cm m
m
P X mps Y c C= − ∈∑  
where cma  is the commodity share parameter in the household consumption function, 
cmps  
the saving rate for households and cζ  a parameter determining the degree of preference for 
low standards food. A smaller cζ  means a larger preference for high standards food. 
Factor use in the production of these commodities will be affected by specific 
investment requirements and market imperfections. In order to produce high standards 
intermediate product, farms face some fixed investment costs to satisfy the standards 
requirement (Farina and Reardon, 2000; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Following Harris 
(1984) and without loss of generality, we assume that these fixed investment costs are a 
                                                 
31 Theoretically, this assumption might have implications for the income of rural and urban households. For 
example, in the presence of inter-regional trade costs and input-output linkages, firms located in the larger 
region would have access to cheaper intermediates and hence could pay higher wages to factors (Krugman and 
Venables, 1995). Considering the additional complexity which would be brought about by incorporating this 
effect, as well as the data paucity, we have decided to ignore this effect. This is a standard assumption in this 
type of models (e.g. de Franco and Godoy, 1993; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002; Gelan, 2007; Stifel and 
Thorbecke, 2003).  
32 This is a modified Linear Expenditure System derived from Stone-Geary utility function (Stone, 1954). ‘This 
demand system has the advantage of specifying non-discretionary and discretionary expenditure.’ (Savard, 
2005) 
33 We only cite the most critical equations in our model while keep the set of all equations in Table A3.1. 
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mixture of rural labor (ϕ ) and capital (ψ ). In the simulations later we will analyze the effect 
of assumptions on fixed costs. 
Rural households are often credit constrained (see e.g., Barham et al., 1996; Swinnen 
and Gow, 1999). We assume that, because of rural credit market imperfections, rural 
households and corporate farms face credit constraints in their production for the high 
standards intermediate product market. To model this we assume that the supply of capital in 
the high standards intermediate sector ( cHK ) for the engaging households and corporate farms 
are constrained as follows: 
(20)                         ,
cc c
HK r c CR CF
εκ= ∈                           
where cκ  is the collateral,34 r  the price of capital, and cε  the capital supply elasticity. 
To model the labor market, we use stylized facts from a ‘typical’ developing 
economy. Net wages of workers in rural region are generally lower than wages of workers in 
urban region, even when rural workers migrate to urban areas. This can be explained by 
different skills of different labor types or by transaction costs of migration (Stifel and 
Thorbecke, 2003). To account for this, we model the labor market as two separate sub-
markets with different skill labor (rural and urban labor), and migrating from rural to urban 
region is subject to iceberg transaction costs, τ , with 0 1τ< < . Thus, /U Rwr wr τ= , where 
Uwr  and Rwr  are the wages for rural workers working in urban and rural regions respectively. 
Finally, as usual in CGE modeling, we assume that leisure is not an argument of the worker’s 
utility function so that labor is supplied inelastically. 
All sectors have zero profit as in the canonical CGE model except the high standards 
intermediate sector, where rural households and corporate farms may earn positive profits if 
credit constraints limit their production capacity to satisfy the market. This reflects the 
                                                 
34 Calibration of the collateral cκ  is realized by setting the capital supply elasticity cε . 
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investment costs of high standards production, which may be prohibitive for poor rural 
households (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2003). 
More specifically, rural households and corporate farms’ profits ( c∏ ) in high 
standards intermediate sector are given by the value-added net of factors payments: 
(21)  ( , , ) ( ) ( ),
c c c c c c c c c
H H H H H R H H HPX f LR A K wr LR tA r K c CR CFϕ ψ∏ = − + − − + ∈       
Profits of corporate farms are transferred to involved factors proportionally according 
to their value shares in production.35
cY
 Since the rural households use mostly their own factors, 
the profits from their high standards farming stay with them. Hence, rural households’ net 
income ( ) is therefore the sum of its profit in high standards farming, factor incomes and 
profit sharing from corporate farms while the urban households’ income is only composed of 
factor incomes and profit sharing: 
(22)            
+ , 
+ ,                   
c c c c c CF
Rc
c c c CF
wr LR tA rK c CR
Y
wuLU rK c CU
γ
γ
 + + +∏ ∏ ∈= 
+ ∏ ∈                   
where cγ  is the endogenous share parameter of transferred profit from corporate farms. 
Finally, we adjust the standard assumption on tradability. We assume a partially open 
economy, i.e., all final goods are traded with the rest of the world (ROW) while intermediate 
goods and factors are internationally immobile. For simplicity, we do not include government 
and taxes in the model. 
This model will allow to trace the impacts of the high standards food expansion on 
rural and urban household income taking into account essential characteristics. It will also 
allow to measure the impact on the share of rural households supplying low standards food 
intermediates and high standards food intermediates and on the share of rural workers 
                                                 
35 This assumption is general and can be easily modified to suit specific cases. It is widely used in the literature 
(e.g., Rodrik, 1998; Stifel and Thorbecke, 2003). The actual distribution of profits among factors depends on the 
bargaining power of factor owners (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2007). In fact, because the profit is not a big 
amount comparing with the overall factor incomes, our assumption will have no significant impact on the 
empirical results. 
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working in own farm versus in corporate farms. In addition, it allows us to disaggregate the 
total income effects into several components, including a profit effect and income effects of 
specific factors. By including different types of rural households in our model we can draw 
implications on poverty and inequality. 
 
3.3. Empirical Implementation 
We calibrate the CGE model of Chapter 3 to data from China for 2005 (see Appendix 
A for details). As usual in CGE models, the data base is organized in the form of a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM), which is shown in Table 3.1. The CGE model is operationalised 
using the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software (Brooke et al., 1988).36
The structure of the model allows us to isolate the effects on urban and rural 
households. In addition, we separate ‘rural households’ into two groups by their income 
level: ‘the poorest’ and ‘the other’ rural households. We define ‘the poorest’ and ‘the other’ 
rural households according to the stratification by the national statistics bureau. The 
households quintile with lowest income in the national statistical data is regarded as ‘the 
poorest’ rural households. The other four quintiles with higher income are grouped together 
to represent the other rural households. Hence, the share of the poorest rural households in 
the whole population is 11.4%. In the base year the poorest rural households had an average 
income per capita of 2090.02 Yuan while the other rural households 5677.81 Yuan. Table 3.2 
shows summary statistics of the income structures of households. 
 
The model is calibrated so as to reproduce the macroeconomic benchmark data from the 
SAM.  
 
                                                 
36 The source code is available from the authors upon request. 
   
 
Table 3.1 Archetype SAM of China When the Same Technology Is Used in High Standards and Low Standards Farming 
(Unit: 100 million Yuan) 
  Low 
inter. 
High 
poorest 
High 
other 
High 
corp. 
Low proc. High 
proc. 
Other 
com. 
Rural 
labor 
Urban 
labor 
Land Capital LaborRCFP LandCFP Capital
CFP 
CFP High 
inter. 
Poorest rural  Other 
rural  
Urban S-I ROW 
Low inter.         23104.2                            
High poorest                               14.0       
High other                               207.7       
High corp.                               11.7       
Low proc.                                 1933.7 14358.2 12512.8 2227.7 1416.8 
High proc.                                 3.0 40.4 242.5 119.3 176.0 
Other com.                                 2163.2 25835.2 36797.7 77173.0 42412.5 
Rural labor 10514.2 5.7 83.9 4.7 1359.1 13.7 29105.5                    
Urban labor        2365.2 40.9 82926.2                        
Land 4362.9 2.3 34.8 2.0 1523.3 15.4                      
Capital 8227.2 4.4 65.7 3.7 2876.9 29.1 40037.2                    
LaborRCFP                   0.6             
LandCFP                      0.2             
CapitalCFP                      0.5             
CFP      1.3                            
High inter.        233.4                               
Poorest rural  1.6           3727.5  370.7  0.05 0.02               
Other rural    23.3         37359.3  5570.1 18471.8 0.5 0.2 0.2              
Urban                85332.2  32772.4   0.3              
S-I                         0.0 21191.4 68551.6     
ROW        1220.8 248.9 32312.7                      10223.0   
Total 23104.2 14.0 207.7 11.7 32449.5 581.3 184381.6 41086.8 85332.2 5940.8 51244.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 233.4 4099.9 61425.3 118104.6 89743.0 44005.3 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on China’s yearbooks and input/output table. Without extra indication, sources are from authors’ calculation.
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Table 3.2 Source of Household Income (%)  
 
Rural labor Urban labor Land Capital Profit Total 
Poorest rural  
90.92  9.04  0.04 100.0 
Other rural  
60.82  9.07 30.07 0.04 100.0 
Urban 
 72.25  27.75 0.00 100.0 
Source: Based on SAM in Table 3.1. 
 
A crucial issue is how to identify ‘high standards’ commodities in the baseline 
because there are no precise data since this is just an emerging sector in China. We 
considered several options and indicators, but none are satisfactory since there are effectively 
non representative data on high standards production and consumption. For example, Hu et al 
(2004) estimated that roughly 30% of food was sold through supermarkets. The large 
wholesale and retail companies defined by Chinese Economic Yearbook (CEYC, 2006) sold 
8.7% of total food. However, Wang et al. (2009) showed that nearly all of this produce came 
through semi-traditional supply channels and production systems. For this reason, and based 
on expert judgements indicating that high standards production is still minimal and not 
particularly linked with specific commodities, we make the working assumption that 5% of 
all commodities were ‘high standards’, and we used this share consistently across production 
systems, investment activities, etc. for the baseline model. Using a rather small share (5%) 
assumption implies that the size of the effects will be small. However, this is less of a 
problem since in this exercise we are primarily interested in the direction and the relative size 
of different sub-effects. Furthermore, in simulations and sensitivity analyzes, we analyze how 
variation in investment costs, production technologies, elasticities etc. in the high standards 
sector affect the growth scenario effects. 
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The calibration involves the determination of all parameters and elasticities and 
processes. 37  This calibration involves several steps. First, measurement units for factor 
categories are chosen such that all commodity prices and factor prices, except the wage of the 
unskilled rural laborer who is working in urban region, are initially equal to unity. 38
Second, elasticities are drawn from the relevant literature.
 
Similarly, measurement units for domestic commodities, imports and exports are chosen such 
that consumer prices and the exchange rate are equal to one in the base year. With these 
normalizations, all initial quantities and remaining prices can be computed. These steps also 
allow the computation of the parameters (which are directly computed from these values). 
Other initial quantities, such as the distributional shares of labor income, land income, capital 
income, profit and investment, reflect the values observed in the data base. 
39
 
 Notice that the choice of 
all elasticities will be subject to sensitivity analysis (Appendix B). Table 3.3 summarizes 
elasticities applied in our model. Specifically, the income elasticities of low standards 
products are 0.9, 0.4 and 0.1 for the poorest and the other rural households, and urban 
households respectively. Such a structure is compatible with the literature and the stylized  
Table 3.3 Parameters Applied in the Model 
 Intermediate product Final food Other commodities 
Elasticity of factor substitution 
 0.7 
0.15 (Agg.); 
0.8 (Sub-nest) 0.9 
Armington elasticity of substitution - 3.0 0.5 
Elasticities of transformation - 1.2 0.8 
 Poorest rural  Other rural Urban 
Income elasticity of low standards food 0.9  0.4 0.1 
 Poorest-high  Other-high Corporate farms 
Price elasticities of capital supply 0.7  1.3 1.9 
                                                 
37 Because of abundance of parameters and meaninglessness of absolute values, we do not provide a complete 
set of all parameters. This kind of presentation method is widely accepted in the literature, e.g., Konan and van 
Assche (2007). 
38 This is a standard treatment in computable general equilibrium models and will have no impact on the results 
since the model is homogenous of degree zero (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). 
39 For a review of literature on elasticities, see Ciaian et al., 2002. 
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facts that poor households consume a relatively larger share of staple (low standards) food 
compared to wealthy households (Lipton, 2001). On the import side, a relatively low 
aggregation elasticity between imports and domestic consumption goods is assumed 
(elasticity of 0.5) for the other commodities sector, which reflects product differentiation 
between the domestically produced commodities and imports of these large aggregates. For 
the food sectors, including both low and high standards food, we assume a rather high 
elasticity of substitution (3.0). In addition, on the export side, the level of elasticities of 
transformation depends on the homogeneity of the aggregated sectors (Shoven and Whalley, 
1992). Given the large sectoral aggregations in our study, we assume intermediate values 
(1.2) for both low and high standards food sectors, and lower value (0.8) for the other 
commodities sector.  
Finally, all production functions are CES in the top nests, with a medium value of 
substitutability among these factors equal to 0.7, 0.15 and 0.9 for intermediate, processing 
and the other commodities sectors, respectively. The choice of relatively small elasticities of 
substitution between intermediate input and other factors is standard and caters to the reality 
(e.g., Wang and Schuh, 2002). The elasticity of substitution among basic factors in the sub-
nest CES of the processing sectors is equal to 0.8. The price elasticities of variable capital 
supply for the high standards intermediate activities of rural households and corporate farms 
are set rather moderately (0.7, 1.3 and 1.9 for the poorest and the other rural households, and 
corporate farms respectively). 
 
3.4. Simulations 
3.4.1. General Approach 
A problem in simulating the expansion of high standards food production is that the 
size of the high standards food sector cannot be changed exogenously in the model. In our 
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CGE framework supply and demand of all commodities, including high standards 
intermediary and final products are endogenously determined. Therefore we ‘induce’ the 
expansion of the high standards food sector in different ways. First, we simulate an increase 
in the world price of high standards products (which is exogenous) – a scenario which we 
refer to as ‘export-led growth’. An important factor is the elasticity of transformation of high 
standards food, i.e., the elasticity of substitution between domestic and exported product. 
Therefore we simulate export-led expansion when the elasticity of transformation is ‘normal’ 
(i.e., as in other models) and when it is high (simulations 1A and 1B). Second, we simulate an 
increase in (domestic) consumer preferences for high standards food. This scenario we refer 
to as ‘domestic demand growth’. As will become clear from the simulations, growth in 
consumer demand induces import growth of high standards food with open trade. Therefore 
we analyze the domestic demand growth scenario with elastic imports (simulation 2A) and 
inelastic imports (simulation 2B). 
A crucial issue in the simulations is the assumption on the technology used by the 
high standards sector in China. As explained above, there are no precise data on the emerging 
high standards sector because it is just an emerging sector in China and there is no consensus 
whether high standards farming in general is relatively labor- or capital-intensive compared 
with other activities (Bijman, 2008; Miyata et al., 2009; Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). 
Therefore we construct a baseline SAM and perform simulations by assuming the same 
production technology, i.e. factor intensities, in high standards and low standards farming.40 
Later, we simulate how different production technologies in high standards farming affect the 
results.41
                                                 
40 In the initial simulations with the same factor intensities for low and high standards, we use the weighted 
average of the factor shares for all agricultural commodities in China. 
 The actual production structures for each scenario (sets of assumptions) can be 
41  When constructing the SAM under assumption that high standards farming is relatively labor (capital) 
intensive, we change labor and capital use in the other commodities sector, so that the SAM keeps its balance. 
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found in Table 3.1. Next, we study the effect of market imperfections. In particular we 
simulate how the impacts change when credit market constraints are more or less binding.  
In addition to these simulations, in order to assess the robustness of our results we 
performed sensitivity analysis of the key assumptions on income elasticities of low standards 
products, the elasticities of transformation and substitution in the Armington equations and 
the substitution elasticities in production. The results, some of which are presented in 
Appendix B, show that our key conclusions are robust to variations in all these parameters. 
 
3.4.2. Scenario 1: Export-led Growth in High Standards 
China has continuously increased its exports of agricultural products and the ratio of 
agricultural trade to agricultural GDP has risen steadily (Huang et al., 2000). According to 
Gulati et al. (2007), an outward-looking trade policy can induce the growth of high quality 
products. The main mechanism for this rise of high standards products is that traders are 
forced to meet international standards and safety regulations. These standards are typically 
considerably higher than in developing countries, such as China. 
To study the potential impact of this export-led emergence of high standard farming, 
we exogenously increase the world market price for high standard products, HFpwe  and 
HFpwm , by 25%. The simulation results for the effect of rising international prices of high 
standard commodities are reported in the first column of Table 3.4. As a consequence of the 
increase in the world market price of HS products, the domestic consumption of HS declines 
(-59%) strongly and that of LS products increases (+0.61%). There is a decline in imports (-
78%) and growth of exports (+31%) of HS products. There is a rise in the domestic price of 
HS products (+1.64%) and corresponding increase in production of both HS products 
(+9.31%) and LS products (+0.48%) because growth in the international demand for HS 
products and growth in the domestic demand for LS products leads to increased production of 
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Table 3.4 Simulation Results: The Same Technology in High Standards and Low 
Standards Farming 
(Percentage change comparing with baseline) 
Sim 1A: World price of high standards food increases by 25% ( / 25%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 25%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Elasticity of transformation of high standards food is normal 
( 1.2tHFσ = ). 
Sim 1B: World price of high standards food increases by 25% ( / 25%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 25%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Elasticity of transformation of high standards food is large 
( 20tHFσ = ). 
Sim 2A: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decreases by 25% 
( / 25%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is elastic ( 3qHFσ = ). 
Sim 2B: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decreases by 25% 
( / 25%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1qHFσ = ). 
 Sim 1A Sim 1B Sim 2A Sim 2B 
Aggregate effects     
Real GDP -0.05 -0.07 0.16  0.03 
CPI  0.48 0.95 -1.09  -0.17 
Gini coefficient -0.28 -0.57 0.51 0.02 
Real Gini coefficient -0.25 -0.53 0.40 -0.04 
Consumptions     
Low standards food 0.61 1.03 -2.19 -0.73 
High standards food -58.58 -99.95 178.22 50.38 
Other commodities 0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.01 
Output of final commodities     
Low standards food 0.48 0.79 -1.91 -0.68 
High standards food 9.31 25.79 24.29 24.66 
Other commodities -0.12 -0.22 0.33 0.08 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 7.58 20.93 20.75 20.59 
Other rural households 8.95 24.71 23.19 23.58 
Corporate farms 9.06 24.83 21.84 22.88 
Trade     
Import volume     
Low standards food 2.65 5.08 -6.84 -1.68 
High standards food -77.73 -99.97 274.11 52.23 
Other commodities 0.25 0.50 -0.52 -0.08 
Export volume     
Low standards food -0.32 -0.76 0.01 -0.30 
High standards food 31.24 130.48 0.96 0.45 
Other commodities -0.41 -0.80 1.01 0.21 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 14.74 44.23 38.89 43.83 
Other rural households 16.21 48.73 45.35 47.40 
Corporate farms 15.42 46.82 43.07 46.56 
Domestic consumer price     
Low standards food 0.67 1.31 -1.61 -0.32 
High standards food 1.64 2.97 10.37 14.55 
Other commodities 0.39 0.78 -0.90 -0.17 
Company food price     
Low standards food 0.67 1.31 -1.60 -0.32 
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High standards food 7.33 21.27 18.92 19.72 
Other commodities 0.37 0.73 -0.84 -0.16 
Farm gate price     
Low standards intermediate product 0.69 1.35 -1.65 -0.33 
High standards intermediate product           10.23 30.00 27.67 28.35 
Factor price     
Rural labor  0.54 1.07 -1.22 -0.22 
Urban labor  0.27 0.55 -0.56 -0.08 
Land 1.52 2.96 -3.63 -0.71 
Capital 0.44 0.85 -1.14 -0.27 
Poorest rural households      
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Factor income effect 0.10 0.20 -0.21 -0.03 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Land 0.09 0.17 -0.22 -0.04 
Total income effect 0.14 0.31 -0.09 0.08 
Other rural households     
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect 0.10 0.20 -0.27 -0.07 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.00 
Land 0.09 0.17 -0.23 -0.05 
Capital -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
Total income effect 0.14 0.31 -0.16 0.05 
Urban households     
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect -0.15 -0.28 0.31 -0.00 
Among it:                        
Labor -0.14 -0.26 0.34 0.04 
Capital -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
Total income effect -0.15 -0.28 0.31 0.00 
 
both. Labor use increases substantially on all farms (around 15%) and returns to all rural 
production factors increase: between 0.44% (capital) and 1.52% (land). As a consequence, 
rural household incomes increase by 0.14% (for both poorest and other households). Urban 
households lose (-0.15%) as their increased wages from increased employment in HS food 
processing are more than offset by increased consumer prices. Notice that the income effects 
are small. The main reason is that the HS sector is small and changes there have relatively 
limited effects on aggregate. Therefore, what is most important here – if one assumes that the 
sector will grow in the future and thus that the size of the effects will become larger – is the 
relative size of the effects. 
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However, another reason is relatively limited ‘pass-through’ of world market effects 
on the domestic market. A comparison with simulation 1B shows that these effects are 
strongly depending on the elasticity of transformation between domestic and exported 
products. With a higher elasticity, the increase in prices is much larger: the price of domestic 
HS food is higher (+2.97%) instead of +1.64% as in the increase in the (farm gate) price of 
HS intermediate goods (+30% instead of +10%). The output response is stronger both for HS 
food (+26% instead of +9%) and HS farm products (more than 20% compared to less than 
10% on all farms). Labor use on farms increase much more (by more than 40%) and the 
income effects for rural households are more than double: +0.31% compared to +0.14%. 
 
3.4.3. Scenario 2: Domestic Demand Growth in High 
Standards 
Simulation 2A models the effect of a growth in domestic preferences for HS food. 
These effects are quite different. Now the substitution between LS and HS food leads to an 
increase in HS food consumption (+178%) but a decline in LS food consumption (-2%). 
However these changes have important implications because most of this increased 
consumption comes from increased imports of HS food (+274%). Domestic production of HS 
food (+24%) and HS intermediate products (+21% to +23%) increase less, while LS 
production falls. Because of the importance of LS production, this leads to a decline for all 
rural factor returns: labor (-1.22%), land (-3.63%) and capital (-1.14%). All rural households 
lose because of this, but the poorest lose less because they own less land and because they 
consume more LS food. Since LS food prices go down, they benefit as consumers. Notice 
that the household income numbers in Table 3.4 reflect real income effects and that we use 
household-specific CPIs to measure these. For example, while the factor price of rural labor 
declines by 1.22% in simulation 2A, the factor income from labor for the poorest household 
increases by 0.01% because their CPI decrease by more than the labor price, as LS food 
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prices (which make up a large share of their expenditures) decline by 1.61%. This is less the 
case for richer households which spend more on HS food whose price increases by more than 
10%. 
Again these results are strongly influenced by the trade effects. In simulations 2B we 
consider the same exogenous change in preferences but with less elastic imports. In this case 
domestic producers benefit more from the increased demand for HS food by domestic 
consumers. In fact, the increased profits from the production of intermediate products for HS 
food more than offset losses from declining prices for LS products. Now rural households 
benefit: their incomes increase slightly: by 0.05% to 0.08%. However in this case urban 
households benefit less from imported HS food. The increase in domestic HS food prices is 
higher (+15% compared to +10%) and the reduction of LS food price lower (-0.32% 
compared to -1.60%). Their net income effects are zero (compared to +0.31%). 
 
3.4.4. Aggregate Effects 
Before turning to some sensitivity analyses let us also briefly consider the overall 
effects. In the export-led scenario both real GDP (by -0.05% to -0.07%) and inequality 
decline (Gini declines by -0.28% to -0.57%). The reason of GDP reduction is that China is a 
net importer of high standards food. With increasing prices for high standards products, the 
negative effect on consumers is larger than the positive effect on producers at the level of the 
country. Hence, the growth in rural incomes with increase international HS prices is more 
than offset by urban consumers’ losses in terms of total growth, but it does lead to a reduction 
in inequality. The aggregated effects of the domestic growth scenario depend on the trade 
effects. With elastic trade responses, the growth in urban household income more than offset 
declines of rural incomes. Hence there is aggregate growth (+0.16%) but inequality increases 
(Gini +0.51%). With inelastic imports, there is still growth but now the Gini coefficient goes 
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up (+0.02%) indicating induced inequality. At first sight, this is surprising since (poorest) 
rural household incomes increase and (richer) urban household income does not change. The 
reason is that the Gini coefficient is calculated in nominal terms or, equivalently, using the 
same CPI for all households. We have therefore also calculated a ‘real Gini’ coefficient 
which uses household-specific CPIs, to capture different consumer effect. As Table 3.4 
shows, the real Gini is negative (-0.04%), showing a reduction in inequality, which reflects 
the real income changes more correctly. 
 
3.4.5. Additional Comparisons Between the Two Scenarios 
To further analyze the difference between the export-led and the domestic demand 
growth scenarios, we compare the two scenarios under the specific conditions that they 
induce the same increase in the relative price of high standards food compared to low 
standards, first at the domestic market and next at their respective consumer markets.42
In Table 3.5, the comparison is based on (approximately) the same relative domestic 
consumer price increase of 1.20%. The first two columns report the results when import is 
elastic. The last two columns report the results when import is inelastic. Notice that due to the 
substitution and transformation in the CGE model and the small size of the HS sector in 
consumption and production, the change of 1.2% of relative consumer prices requires a large 
change in world market prices for HS (46% and 70% respectively), and a more modest 
change in urban household preference (2.3% to 2.5%). 
  
The most important insight is that export-led growth has a more significant impact on 
real incomes of rural households. For example, when import is elastic, the same relative 
consumer price increase will lead to income increases by 0.42% and 0.40% for the poorest 
and other rural households respectively in the scenario of  export-led growth, while it will 
                                                 
42 Relative price increase=(Price of high standards food/Price of  low standards food-1)*100 
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hardly affect rural households income (0.00% and 0.01% change) in the scenario of  domestic 
demand growth. The Gini coefficients also reflect this. In both scenarios, the poorest rural 
households can gain the production of HS (also through its impact on factor markets), but the 
impact from factor markets, poorest rural households lose a little in the scenario of domestic 
demand growth in total because they lose with a decline in the demand for low standards 
production and its price. Nonetheless, they gain a lot from the factor markets (+0.20%) in the 
scenario of export-led growth. 
  
Table 3.5 Comparing Export-led Growth and Domestic Demand Growth 
(Percentage change comparing with baseline) 
Sim 5A: World price of high standards food increases by 70% ( / 70%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 70%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Import is elastic ( 3qHFσ = ). 
Sim 6A: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decreases by 2.5% 
( / 2.5%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is elastic ( 3qHFσ = ). 
Sim 5B: World price of high standards food increases by 46% ( / 46%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 46%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1qHFσ = ). 
Sim 6B: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decreases by 2.3% 
( / 2.3%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1qHFσ = ). 
 Sim 5A Sim 6A Sim 5B Sim 6B 
Aggregate effects     
Real GDP -0.05 0.01 -0.06  0.00 
CPI  0.99 -0.05 0.64  -0.01 
Gini coefficient -0.66 0.02 -0.37 0.00 
Real Gini coefficient -0.61 0.02 -0.34 -0.00 
Relative price increase*  1.20 1.23 1.20 1.22 
Consumptions     
Low standards food 0.61 -0.11 0.65 -0.05 
High standards food -33.56 3.96 -70.08 3.96 
Other commodities 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Output of final commodities     
Low standards food 0.54 -0.10 0.60 -0.05 
High standards food 40.37 2.02 14.32 2.00 
Other commodities -0.21 0.02 -0.16 0.01 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 32.75 1.72 11.66 1.69 
Other rural households 38.55 1.94 13.75 1.93 
Corporate farms 38.42 1.86 13.86 1.87 
Trade     
Import volume     
Low standards food 4.92 -0.36 3.44 -0.13 
High standards food -94.88 13.81 -73.95 4.28 
Other commodities 0.56 -0.03 0.33 -0.01 
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Export volume     
Low standards food -1.06 -0.01 -0.45 -0.02 
High standards food 85.28 0.27 58.15 0.24 
Other commodities -0.83 0.05 -0.54 0.02 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 70.00 2.91 22.08 2.90 
Other rural households 83.85 3.40 26.31 3.39 
Corporate farms 82.40 3.27 26.04 3.29 
Domestic consumer price     
Low standards food 1.35 -0.08 0.88 -0.02 
High standards food 2.57 1.15 2.09 1.19 
Other commodities 0.83 -0.05 0.52 -0.01 
Company price     
Low standards food 1.34 -0.08 0.88 -0.02 
High standards food 34.89 1.46 11.40 1.47 
Other commodities 0.77 -0.04 0.49 -0.01 
Farm gate price     
Low standards intermediate product 1.38 -0.08 0.90 -0.03 
High standards intermediate product           49.64 2.10 15.99 2.10 
Factor price     
Rural labor  1.13 -0.06 0.71 -0.02 
Urban labor  0.61 -0.03 0.36 -0.01 
Land 3.01 -0.18 1.98 -0.05 
Capital 0.85 -0.06 0.58 -0.02 
Poorest rural households      
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect 0.22 -0.01 0.13 -0.00 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Land 0.17 -0.01 0.12 -0.00 
Total income effect 0.42 -0.00 0.19 0.01 
Other rural households     
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect 0.20 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.07 -0.00 0.04 -0.00 
Land 0.18 -0.01 0.12 -0.00 
Capital -0.05 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
Total income effect 0.40 -0.01 0.19 0.00 
Urban households     
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect -0.29 0.01 -0.19 -0.00 
Among it:                        
Labor -0.26 0.01 -0.18 0.00 
Capital -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Total income effect -0.29 0.01 -0.19 -0.00 
* Relative price increase=(Price of high standards food/Price of  low standards food-1)*100 
Note: The comparison is based on common relative price increase, i.e., the two simulations 
have nearly the same relative price increase. 
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In Table 3.6, comparison is based on the same relative price increase but on different 
markets. For the export-led growth, we consider a 25% increase in the relative price of HS on 
the world market.  For the domestic demand growth, we consider a 25% relative price 
increase in domestic consumer prices. The logic of this comparison is that world price change 
reveals preference changes of international consumers while domestic consumer price change 
reveals preference changes of domestic consumers. 
The export-led growth has the same effects as in Table 3.5 but smaller in size since 
the price increase on the world market is lower (25% compared to 46% or 70% in Table 3.5). 
So rural households benefit less. Their incomes increase by 0.14% for each. However, under 
the domestic shift in preference, rural households lose significantly with these large domestic 
price changes. Farm gate prices increase sharply for HS, but decline substantially for LS, 
causing substantial reduction in income for all rural households and especially for the poor 
who depend more on LS products for their income. 
 In summary, these additional comparisons generally confirm our earlier conclusions, 
but also show that the seemingly same shock, i.e., the same relative price increase, may have 
quite different welfare impacts depending on the source of the shock, and that different 
shocks have different transmission mechanisms. 
 
Table 3.6 Comparing Export-led Growth and Domestic Demand Growth 
(Percentage change comparing with baseline) 
Sim 7A: World price of high standards food increases by 25% ( / 25%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 25%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Import is elastic ( 3qHFσ = ). 
Sim 8A: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decreases by 55% 
( / 55%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is elastic ( 3qHFσ = ). 
Sim 7B: World price of high standards food increase by 25% ( / 25%PH PHpwe pwe∆ =+ , 
/ 25%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1qHFσ = ). 
Sim 8B: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decrease by 39% 
( / 39%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1qHFσ = ). 
 Sim 7A Sim 8A Sim 7B Sim 8B 
Aggregate effects     
Real GDP -0.05 0.71 -0.04 0.06 
CPI  0.48 -4.33 0.31 -0.30 
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Gini coefficient -0.28 2.21 -0.17 0.03 
Real Gini coefficient -0.25 1.83 -0.15 -0.09 
Relative price increase*  25.00 24.87 25.00 25.25 
Consumptions     
Low standards food 0.61 -7.71 0.40 -1.24 
High standards food -58.58 97.91 -40.95 78.76 
Other commodities 0.05 0.26 -0.01 0.06 
Output of final commodities     
Low standards food 0.48 -7.34 0.37 -1.21 
High standards food 9.31 51.65 2.41 41.03 
Other commodities -0.12 1.34 -0.08 0.14 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 7.58 45.17 1.89 34.06 
Other rural households 8.95 48.92 2.33 39.11 
Corporate farms 9.06 43.88 2.46 37.86 
Trade     
Import volume     
Low standards food 2.65 -24.81 1.78 -2.95 
High standards food -77.73 1077.32 -44.73 87.89 
Other commodities 0.25 -2.04 0.15 -0.13 
Export volume     
Low standards food -0.32 0.17 -0.15 -0.55 
High standards food 31.24 -3.02 30.76 -1.70 
Other commodities -0.41 4.06 -0.27 0.36 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households 14.74 95.51 3.58 71.47 
Other rural households 16.21 109.77 4.31 84.60 
Corporate farms 15.42 101.03 4.38 81.66 
Domestic consumer price     
Low standards food 0.67 -6.37 0.44 -0.56 
High standards food 1.64 16.92 1.17 24.55 
Other commodities 0.39 -3.52 0.25 -0.29 
Company price     
Low standards food 0.67 -6.29 0.44 -0.55 
High standards food 7.33 45.14 1.97 35.09 
Other commodities 0.37 -3.26 0.24 -0.27 
Farm gate price     
Low standards intermediate product 0.69 -6.49 0.45 -0.57 
High standards intermediate product           10.23 67.38 2.66 50.64 
Factor price     
Rural labor  0.54 -4.79 0.35 -0.37 
Urban labor  0.27 -2.18 0.17 -0.14 
Land 1.52 -14.31 0.99 -1.25 
Capital 0.44 -4.35 0.29 -0.46 
Poorest rural households      
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.03 0.33 0.01 0.21 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Factor income effect 0.10 -0.84 0.06 -0.05 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 
Land 0.09 -0.90 0.06 -0.08 
Total income effect 0.14 -0.50 0.07 0.17 
Other rural households     
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.21 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
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Factor income effect 0.10 -1.05 0.07 -0.12 
Among it:                        
Labor 0.03 -0.18 0.02 -0.01 
Land 0.09 -0.93 0.06 -0.08 
Capital -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
Total income effect 0.14 -0.72 0.08 0.10 
Urban households     
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect -0.15 1.41 -0.10 0.01 
Among it:                        
Labor -0.14 1.47 -0.10 0.07 
Capital -0.01 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 
Total income effect -0.15 1.41 -0.10 0.01 
* Relative price increase=(Price of high standards food/Price of  low standards food-1)*100; 
For the export-led growth, the increase is on world price. And for the domestic demand 
growth, the increase is on domestic consumer price. 
Note: The comparison is based on common relative price increase, i.e., the two simulations 
have nearly the same relative price increase. 
 
3.4.6. Sensitivity Analyses 
Figures 3.2-3.5 summarize a series of sensitivity analyses (and Figures A3.1 – A3.4 in 
appendix show the results of further robustness tests). Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the effect of 
differences in technology used in HS farming. Figure 3.2 shows under the export-led scenario 
how rural households will benefit more (less) if the technology used in HS farming is 
more(less) labor intensive (see also Table A3.2 in Appendix for more details). This effect is 
strongest for the poorest as is reflected in the different curves for poorer and other rural 
households. Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows (under the domestic growth scenario) how the rural 
households (and especially the poorest) will lose less with more labor intensive HS farming 
(see also Table A3.3 in Appendix for more details). 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the impact of credit constraints. Lower (higher) capital supply 
elasticity represents more (less) credit constraints. The figure shows that income effects for 
rural households are lower with stronger credit constraints. Capital market imperfections thus 
limit the potential benefits of HS expansion for farmers. 
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the effects of investment requirements for HS farmers. The 
simulations show that in particular poor farmers are negatively affected by higher investment 
costs. 
Figure 3.2 Export-led Expansion under Different Technologies in High Standards 
Farming 
(Baseline = Sim 1A) 
 
Figure 3.3 Domestic Demand Growth with Elastic Import under Different Technologies 
(Baseline = Sim 2A) 
 
Baseline 
Baseline 
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Figure 3.4 Export-led Expansion with Different Credit Constraints 
(Baseline = Sim 1A) 
  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Export-led Expansion with Different Fixed Investment Costs 
(Baseline = Sim 1A) 
 
Baseline 
Baseline 
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3.5. Conclusions and Discussions 
In this chapter we analyze how the expansion of high standards food production affect 
the structural production changes, the incomes of different types of rural and urban 
households, and the rural poverty and equity by using a CGE model with market 
imperfections. We explicitly model credit constraints and its consequences for poverty and 
equity. In addition, we explicitly model households’ preferences for high standards food. We 
use 2005 data from China to calibrate our model and perform two simulations: the effect of 
an increase in the world price of high standards food and an increase in urban households’ 
preference for high standards food. 
This chapter is the first to show the complex set of factors that will determine growth 
and equity effects of HS growth. First, the simulation results show that poor rural households 
will expand their production of high standards product with the increase of world price for 
high standards food. In this way an expansion in the high standards food sector leads to a 
reduction of poverty and of inequality. Second, expansion of high standards sector resulting 
from domestic preference changes may increase or decrease real incomes of poor rural 
households, and hence increases or decreases inequality (depending on whether HS 
production can compete with HS imports.). Third, the effects are influenced by technology, 
required investment costs and factor market imperfections. A reduction in credit constraints 
induces an increase in high standards farming and rural households will gain more. If the 
technology used in high standards farming is more labor intensive it will benefit the poor 
more, and vice versa. Fourth, the spillover effects of HS demand growth on other product 
markets (in this in particular LS markets) is important. Since poor rural households depend 
importantly on HS production they may benefit or lose from spillover effects. As we showed 
here, the effects depend, among others, on where HS demand comes from and on substitution 
between imports and domestic products. 
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In summary, our chapter shows the importance of taking into account all the relevant 
effects. The simulation results have shown that the general equilibrium effects can be very 
different from partial equilibrium effects. The overall welfare effects of standards on poor 
rural households are determined by the trade-off of all the relevant effects. Overlooking some 
effects may lead to biased, and sometimes wrong, policy conclusions. 
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Chapter 4. Extension to the General Equilibrium Model: The Impact of Contracts 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Interlinked contracts are one example of so-called ‘hybrid’ organizational forms 
leading to vertical coordination in rural economies, according to Williamson (1975). 
Interlinked transactions can be considered as a kind of package deal, with the terms of one 
transaction contingent upon the terms in another (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). The introduction 
of higher quality requirements in developing and transition countries has coincided with the 
growth of contracting (Swinnen, 2007). In global value chains, processing, marketing and 
input supplying companies have engaged in a variety of forms of contracting with farmers 
(Reardon et al., 2009; Segura, 2006). 
According to the literature, interlinked contracts are beneficial for processors for at 
least two reasons. First, interlinked contracts allow the trader to counteract the effect of 
imperfect factor markets on the farmer’s production efficiency (Gangopadhyay and 
Sengupata, 1987; Vandemoortele et al., 2009). When the farmer faces a high interest rate in 
the credit market, the trader can encourage the farmer to increase his output by providing 
credit at a low interest rate and extract the surplus by offering a low purchase price. Second, 
interlinked transactions can internalize some externalities if moral hazard is an important 
constraint (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982). 
At the same time, farmers benefit from contracts by gaining access to an assured 
market. In some cases, net output prices are higher for contracted produce. In such cases crop 
revenues will be higher as well (Reardon et al., 2009). Farmers also benefit from contracts by 
obtaining credit to enter into high-value chains. Due to asymmetric information and hence 
credit rationing, farmers may face difficulties in accessing credit from normal banks (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). This kind of market imperfection is especially widespread in developing 
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and transition countries (e.g., Carter, 1988; Swinnen and Gow, 1999) and has substantial 
impact on the inclusion of smallholders in modern supply chains.  
Empirical evidence shows that even though small farmers have incentives to 
participate in contract farming, they may not be able to get contracts. For example, studies in 
Latin America and Africa argue that small farmers were being left behind in supermarket-
driven horticultural marketing and trade (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Key and Runsten, 
1999; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001). One of the reported reasons was that 
small farmers utilize the granted credit less efficiently due to their smaller scale of operation 
– which prevents them from exploiting any scale economies (Reardon et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, smallholders offer some advantages. For example, they may be more able and 
willing to follow highly labor-intensive field management practices (von Braun et al., 1989) 
because of weaker bargaining power or because of the availability of cheap family labor. The 
trade-off between these advantages and disadvantages determines whether they can be 
included in and benefit from high-value chains. 
The development of contract farming in China is particularly relevant for three 
reasons. First, even though China has sustained high growth rates for nearly thirty years and 
the continuously increasing income per capita is already leading to structural changes in 
Chinese diets (Gale and Huang, 2007), the food distribution system has lagged behind in 
undergoing structural change until very recently. In recent years, however, the arrival of 
large-scale retail operations (domestic as well as foreign) and some food safety scandals have 
triggered the start of a transformation process (Hu et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2009). Yet the 
transition from a system thriving mainly on low standards food produced by millions of small 
farms43
                                                 
43 In China, the average farm size is less than 0.5 hectare, which is much smaller than in other Asian developing 
countries (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005). 
 (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) to one thriving on high standards food is still in its 
infancy and will undoubtedly have a huge impact on both producers and consumers. Second, 
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despite high growth rates, rising inequality between poor and wealthy households becomes an 
increasingly severe problem (Ravallion, 2001). After an initially fast rate of poverty 
reduction, in the last decade China has been facing considerably more difficulties in reducing 
rural poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2007; Riskin, 2004). 90% of poverty is still rural in China 
(World Bank, 2009). The welfare and poverty effects associated with the expansion of 
contract farming are therefore potentially very important. Third, both the agricultural 
commodity and factor markets are in transition. Whereas the commodity market is becoming 
more and more efficient (Huang and Rozelle, 2006), factor market imperfections remain 
important. Therefore, China provides a very interesting case for research on the interaction 
between the food system transition and the acute equity and poverty problems under 
conditions of market imperfections. 
We will first illustrate the rationale for processors to give contracts to farmers by 
constructing a simple partial equilibrium model. Then we use a CGE model modified from 
Chapter 3 to simulate the decision of processors and the corresponding welfare effects. 
 
4.2. The Partial Equilibrium Model 
Consider an agricultural economy with one representative farmer and one 
representative processor. The output of the farmer is a function of the amount of labor (L) and 
capital (K). The production function is represented by ( , )q f L K=  with 0if > , 0iif < , 0ijf > , 
for i, j = L and K. We assume constant returns to scale and the farmer’s profit is 
(23) ( , )F pf L K wL rK= − −∏  
where p is the price of the farm product, w is the price of labor, and r is the price of capital. 
The output of the processor is a function of farm output. The production function is 
represented by ( )Q g q=  with 0qg > , 0qqg < , and the profit is 
(24) ( )P Pg q pq= −∏  
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where P is the price of the final product. 
 
4.2.1. Perfect Credit Markets 
To establish a point of comparison, we first identify the equilibrium without credit 
market constraints. With perfect credit markets, farmers are not constrained in the quantity of 
inputs they use. The farmer will choose the quantity of capital that maximizes his profit given 
by equation (23). This implies the following equilibrium condition respective to capital 
demand: 
(25) 0Kpf r− =  
Similarly, for the processor, the maximization of profit given by equation (24) gives 
the intermediate demand function: 
(26) 0qPg p− =  
Because the supply of farm output is flexible to adjust to the processor’s demand due 
to constant returns to scale and perfect markets, the transaction can be carried out through 
spot markets without any constraints. 
 
4.2.2. Imperfect Credit Markets 
To model imperfect credit markets, we follow the general approach of Ciaian and 
Swinnen (2009) by introducing a farmer credit constraint. It is assumed that the maximum 
amount of credit (S) that a farmer can borrow depends on farmer characteristics (W) such as 
the scale of operation, farmer profits, and assets. Hence, ( )S S W=  with / 0dS dW > . The 
credit constraint is given by 
(27) ( )rK S W≤  
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With a credit constraint, the decision-making problem of the farmer is the 
maximization of his profit function, as given by equation (23), subject to credit constraint 
(27), as represented by the LaGrange function 
(28) ( , ) ( )pf L K wL rK rK SλΨ = − − − −  
where λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint. 
When the credit constraint is binding, the farmer cannot use the unconstrained optimal 
level of capital and capital use is determined by ( ) /K S W r= . 
With binding credit constraints ( 0λ > ), the demand for capital will be given by  
(29) (1 ) 0Kpf r λ− + =  
from which it follows that the marginal value product of capital is higher than the marginal 
cost of capital r: Kpf r> . By increasing the level of capital use, the farmer could increase his 
profit but he cannot use more capital because of the credit constraint. As /Kf r p>  (where 
/r p  is the marginal capital productivity with perfect credit market), 0Kf >  and 0KKf < , 
output q will be lower with imperfect credit markets compared to the case of perfect credit 
markets. 
As farm output is reduced, the processor will be constrained in its procurement. The 
processor’s profit maximization problem then becomes 
(30) ( )P Pg q pq= −∏  
s.t. maxq q≤  
where maxq  is the maximum output of the farmer under credit constraints. 
Maximization of the corresponding LaGrange function leads to the following 
intermediate demand function for the processor: 
(31) 0qPg p γ− − =  
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where γ  is the shadow price of constraint maxq q≤ . By using more intermediate inputs, the 
processor could increase its profit, but it cannot use more intermediate inputs because of the 
farm output constraint, which results from the credit constraint on the farmer. 
This result is an example of a negative vertical externality, which has been explored 
earlier in a model of double marginalization by Spengler (1950), and leads to a positive 
incentive for the processor to provide credit contracts to the farmer.44
 
 
4.2.3. Interlinked Contracts 
To overcome the negative vertical externality created by imperfect credit markets, the 
processor can offer an interlinked contract to its suppliers so as to increase farm output, as 
well as to acquire exclusive procurement rights on this output. In other words, contingent on 
selling the output to the processor, farmers are given credit to attenuate their capital 
constraints. 
With the credit given by the processor, farmers can get higher profits. Since the 
increased profits originate from relaxed credit constraints by the processor, the latter usually 
has the power to claim a share of them. Different bargaining power between these two 
players may result in different sharing rules for distribution of the profits (Nash, 1950). The 
bargaining power is reflected implicitly in the price of the intermediate product paid by the 
processor. If the processor can discriminate prices between farmers, prices can be derived 
based on equation (31) as follows: 
(32) 0q qPg p q p γ− − − =  
where p  is now not exogenously given but dependent on the output of farmers. 0qp >  
implies that larger farmers will have higher bargaining power. 
 
                                                 
44 There is a vast literature documenting these incentives but with probably different explanations, e.g., see 
Vandemoortele et al. (2009). 
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Bargaining power can also be calculated explicitly by the share of profit transferred 
from the farmer to the processor, resulting in the following equation: 45
(33) 
 
0q q FPg p γ α− − + =∏  
where 0α ≥  is the share of profit transferred to the processor and 0qα < .  
In both cases, the processor faces a trade-off between increasing its profit by 
increasing output or by increasing its profit transfer from farmers. In Figure 4.1, line 1∏  
shows that the processor’s production profits increase with output and line 2∏  shows that 
the scope for profit transfer from farmers is reduced with increasing output. The sum of these 
two revenues is represented by P∏ , and P∏  is maximized at point A. 
Since the choice among different farmers is a corner solution when the distribution of 
farmer types is not continuous, we simulate the decision-making by comparing the profits 
Figure 4.1 Trade-off of Processor  
 
                                                 
45 This equation uses the FOC of farmer’s profit maximization that 0F q =∏ . 
P∏
 
A 
P∏  
1∏  
q 
2∏  
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among different possible choices of farmer types. Consequently, we study the welfare impact 
of these choices on farmers by extending the CGE model. 
 
4.3. Modifications of the CGE Model 
The current CGE model is based on the model in Chapter 3 with some modifications 
to account for interlinked contracts. Figure A4.1 and Table A4.1 summarize the model 
structure, with a symbol (†) to show differences from the model in Chapter 3. In what 
follows, the main modifications are described. 
First, a processor in the high standards sector will have positive profits. Hence its 
income will increase with output. We assume monopolistic competition in the high standards 
processing sector by following Harris (1984). Since processors have positive profits, our 
model can be regarded as a short-run equilibrium (Harris, 1984).46
(34) 
 This is acceptable for our 
objective. The optimal pricing rule is the Lerner formula 
( ) / 1/poH poH poH poHPXI AC PXI ε− =  
where poHPXI  is the producer price of the high standards final good, poHε  is the perceived 
demand elasticity, and poHAC  is the average cost. The processor’s profit can be calculated as: 
(35) ( )*P poH poH poHPXI AC QX= −∏  
where poHQX  is the output level of high standards food. 
As in a general equilibrium, all incomes should eventually return to the factor owners, 
we assume that the profit of the processor is proportionally transferred to the owners of 
factors used by the processor. This assumption may have a critical impact on the results since 
processors may as well transfer profits abroad if foreign firms dominate the high standards 
                                                 
46 As Harris (1984) stated, ‘The short run is a period in which industry structure is fixed. The following 
variables are held constant in the noncompetitive industries: markups on unit cost by firms; number of firms in 
each industry; number of product lines of each firm; and number of domestic and foreign product lines. … All 
other economic variables adjust within the short run. This includes commodity and factor prices, outputs, 
employment of variable factors, etc. This short run is similar to but not quite the same as the Marshallian short 
run of textbook economics.’ 
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sector (Konan and van Assche, 2007). However, we do not have data on the share of foreign 
firms in the high standards processing sector and on how they would allocate and distribute 
their profits. Hence we are not able to capture this effect exactly. A general conjecture is that 
the benefits to domestic households may be less if foreign firms transfer profits abroad. 
Second, interlinked contracts are introduced by relaxing credit constraints for the 
poorest rural households, other rural households and corporate farms consecutively. We 
simulate and compare the different cases to find the optimal choice of farmer type for the 
high standards processor. 
Third, we study the impact of rent sharing on farmer welfare by assuming that the 
farmer profits due to credit from the processor are partially transferred to the latter. The 
sharing rule for these profit transfers is different and determined by the farmer’s bargaining 
power. We assume a structural distribution of bargaining power among farmers, i.e., farmers 
with higher efficiency of utilizing capital have higher bargaining power. 
 
4.4. Simulations 
We calibrate the model to the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) in Chapter 3 with 
some modifications (marked by shading in Table 4.1). First, the high standards processor has 
positive profits. Because there are no reliable data available on profit rates of  high standards 
processing and because the high standards sector is normally regarded as having a higher 
profit rate (Reardon et al., 2009), we assume a profit rate of 10%, exceeding the average 
profit rate of the processing sector (6.2% according to CECFIY (2006)). Second, this profit is 
transferred proportionally to the owners of factors in this sector through an additional sub- 
matrix. For calibration, elasticities are drawn from the relevant literature and Table 3.3 in 
Chapter 3 summarizes elasticities applied in our model. The perceived demand elasticity for 
high standards products is calibrated to suit the assumed profit rate. 
  
Table 4.1 Archetype SAM of China: With Contracts 
(Unit: 100 million Yuan) 
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Note: New added sub-matrices are shown by shading.
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Our main objective is to find the impact of credit provision by processors in 
the high standards sector to different farmer types. This is implemented by adding the 
same value (50) to the collaterals of different farmers, cκ . 47
 
 The theoretic model 
shows that the processor will have higher profits by providing credit due to the 
removal of the negative vertical externality even without transfer of profits from 
farmers. Hence, we simulate the effects first without profit transfers, then with profit 
transfers. Table 4.2 and 4.3 report the simulation results. 
4.4.1. Credit Provision Without Profit Transfers 
The simulation results of granting 50 units of credit as the collateral of the 
poorest rural households ( 50PRκ∆ = ) are reported in the first column of Table 4.2. 
The real incomes of the poorest rural households and the urban households increase 
by 0.97% and 0.05% respectively. The rise in the income of the poorest rural 
households results from increasing profits in high standards farming (0.99%). Lower 
credit constraints lead to a relatively higher production of high standards intermediate 
products by the poorest rural households (1892.85%). Due to output growth, the high 
standards processor increases profits by 106.80%. 
The simulation results of granting 50 units of credit as the collateral of the 
other rural households ( 50ORκ∆ = ) are reported in the second column of Table 4.2. 
The real incomes of the other rural households and the urban households increase (by 
0.05% and 0.06% respectively) while the poorest rural households lose by 0.02%. The 
loss in income of the poorest rural households results from decreasing profits in high 
standards farming (-0.01%) and decreasing factor incomes (-0.03%). Even though the 
                                                 
47 The credit from processors works just like a guarantee, helping farmers be able to get more capital 
from banks. This method makes the comparison among different scenarios possible because the 
counterfactual changes mean the same cost for the processor. 
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Table 4.2 Simulation Results: Without Profit Transfers 
(Percentage Change) 
Sim 9A: Grant 50 units of credit to poorest rural households  ( 50PRκ∆ = ) 
Sim 9B: Grant 50 units of credit to other rural households  ( 50ORκ∆ = ) 
Sim 9C: Grant 50 units of credit  to corporate farms ( 50CFκ∆ = ) 
 Sim 9A Sim 9B Sim 9C 
Gini coefficient -0.04 0.02 -0.01 
Output of high standards intermediate product 111.22 159.02 273.88 
High standards processor profit 106.80 151.81 258.38 
Individual output of high standards intermediate product    
Poorest rural households 1892.85 -2.72 -4.21 
Other rural households -2.31 179.03 -4.79 
Corporate farms -2.27 -3.03 5554.47 
Domestic commodity price    
Low standards food -0.05 -0.03 0.08 
High standards food -1.74 -2.36 -3.64 
Other commodities 0.02 0.04 0.15 
Factor price    
Rural labor  -0.03 -0.00 0.10 
Urban labor  0.04 0.06 0.18 
Land -0.20 -0.24 -0.04 
Capital* -0.00 0.02 0.09 
Poorest rural households     
Profit effect 0.99 -0.01 -0.02 
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.11 
Factor income effect -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Land -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Total income effect 0.97 -0.02 0.11 
Other rural households    
Profit effect -0.01 0.05 -0.02 
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.10 
Factor income effect -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Land -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Total income effect -0.02 0.05 0.09 
Urban households    
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.02 
Factor income effect 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Among it:                       
Labor 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Total income effect 0.05 0.06 0.09 
* Because high standards farming sector is relatively labor intensive comparing with 
other non-agricultural sectors, the expansion of this sector results in lower price for 
capital. When we assume a capital intensive technology for high standards farming, 
the expansion results in higher capital price, which has been checked by the authors. 
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Table 4.3 Simulation Results: With Profit Transfers 
(Percentage Change) 
Sim 10A: Grant 50 units of credit to poorest rural households  ( 50PRκ∆ = ) 
Sim 10B: Grant 50 units of credit to other rural households  ( 50ORκ∆ = ) 
Sim 10C: Grant 50 units of credit  to corporate farms ( 50CFκ∆ = ) 
 Sim 10A Sim 10B Sim 10C 
Gini coefficient 0.06 0.04 0.00 
Output of high standards intermediate product 111.28 159.02 273.88 
Processor profit 229.39 201.16 286.32 
Individual output of high standards intermediate product    
Poorest rural households 1893.33 -2.72 -4.21 
Other rural households -2.29 179.03 -4.79 
Corporate farms -2.24 -3.03 5554.48 
Domestic commodity price    
Low standards food -0.06 -0.04 0.07 
High standards food -1.73 -2.36 -3.65 
Other commodities 0.02 0.04 0.15 
Factor price    
Rural labor  -0.03 -0.00 0.10 
Urban labor  0.04 0.07 0.18 
Land -0.25 -0.25 -0.05 
Capital -0.01 0.02 0.09 
Poorest rural households     
Profit effect 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.10 
Factor income effect -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Land -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Total income effect 0.10 -0.01 0.10 
Other rural households    
Profit effect -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.09 
Factor income effect -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Land -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Total income effect -0.00 0.03 0.09 
Urban households    
Transferred profit from HS processor 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Transferred profit from CF -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Factor income effect 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Among it:                       
Labor 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Total income effect 0.08 0.07 0.10 
 
weaker credit constraints lead to an expansion of the high standards farming sector, 
this expansion leads to the expansion of the high standards processing sector directly 
82                                                                                                                                        Chapter 4 
 
and of other commodities indirectly through lower factor prices and higher real 
incomes. Both the high standards processing sector and the other commodity sector 
utilize relatively more factors mainly located in urban area, like urban labor and 
capital. As a result, the prices of these factors increase while prices of other factors 
decrease. An asymmetric reduction of credit constraints leads to a higher share of 
production of high standards intermediate products by the other rural households 
(179.03%) and a lower share of production by the poorest rural households (-2.72%). 
Due to the increase in high standards farm output, the high standards processors 
increase profits by 151.81%. 
The simulation results of granting 50 units of credit as the collateral of 
corporate farms ( 50CFκ∆ = ) are reported in the last column of Table 4.2. The real 
incomes of all households increase (by 0.11%, 0.09% and 0.09% respectively). The 
gain in the income of the poorest rural households results from increasing transferred 
profits both from corporate farms (0.11%) and from the high standards processor 
(0.04%). Even though the lower credit constraints for the corporate farms lead to 
decreasing profit (-0.02%) and decreasing factor incomes (-0.02%), the transferred 
profits compensate for these losses and generate a positive effect. An asymmetric 
reduction of credit constraints leads to a higher share of production of high standards 
intermediate products by the corporate farms (5554.47%). Due to the increase in high 
standards farm output, the high standards processor increases its profits by 258.38%. 
Based on the three simulations the high standards processor will maximize its 
profits by providing credit to the corporate farms. This preference to work with larger 
farms has been described extensively in the empirical literature (e.g., Carter and 
Mesbah, 1993; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). However, even though the poorest rural 
households lose by being excluded from participating in the contracts, they benefit 
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from profit transfers, especially of the profit from corporate farms, which use more 
rural factors as inputs. 
 
4.4.2. Credit Provision with Profit Transfers 
In contrast with the simulations in the last sub-section, we will now assume 
that farmers transfer a part of the profits obtained through increased access to credit to 
the high standards processor. The literature tells us that corporate and large farms 
usually have higher bargaining power than small farmers (Reardon et al., 2009). 
Hence we assume that 90% of the profit surplus of poorest rural households will be 
transferred to the processor, while only 50% and 10% will be transferred by other 
rural households and corporate farms respectively.48
In the third row of Table 4.3 we see that even after accounting for profit 
transfer, the high standards processor still gains more profits by providing credit to 
corporate farms. Interestingly, when we compare the results for contracting with the 
poorest rural households and other rural households, we find that the processor can 
benefit more from granting credit to the poorest rural households (229.39%) than to 
other rural households (201.16%). This means that when having to choose between 
these two farmer types, the processor will choose to sign contracts with the poorest 
rural households, whose weaker bargaining power makes them attractive for 
contracting.
 Results are reported in Table 4.3. 
49
                                                 
48 The distribution of profits between farms and processors are endogenous in reality (Swinnen and 
Vandeplas, 2007). The endogeneity comes from competition both between farmers and processors, and 
among rural households and corporate farms. However, to allow comparison of different scenarios, we 
use a structurally reasonable assumption. As will be presented in the following subsection, the 
sensitivity analyses show that this assumption has a minor impact on the results since the most critical 
factor in the current situation is efficiency of farms. 
 Several studies provide evidence of the inclusion of small farmers in 
49 This results are driven by the assumption of division rule between farmers and processors and will be 
subject to sensitivity analyses. 
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high standards value chains, but with different explanations (see e.g., Dries and 
Swinnen (2004); von Braun et al. (1989)). 
Moreover, even though poorest rural households transfer most of their profit 
surplus to the processor, they do keep 10% of the profit surplus for themselves and 
benefit from the profit transfer from the processor (0.04%). After compensating for 
the reduction of factor incomes (-0.03%), these effects lead to an overall positive 
welfare effect (0.10%). 
 
4.4.3. Sensitivity Analyses 
In order to assess the robustness of our results we perform sensitivity analysis 
of the key assumptions. 50
PRε
 Because different combinations of efficiency and 
bargaining power can result in different patterns of decision making by processors, we 
especially verify the robustness of these effects by weakening poorest rural 
households’ credit constraints through a change in the capital supply elasticity. Figure 
4.2 shows the impact of different capital supply elasticity of poorest rural households. 
The horizontal axis measures the capital supply elasticity of poorest rural households 
. The left and right vertical axes measure profit change of processor and income 
change of poorest rural households respectively. In the baseline, when the capital 
supply elasticity is 0.7, the processor’s profit increases by 229.39% and the real 
income of poorest rural households increases by 0.1%. And when the capital supply 
elasticity is larger (1.3), the processor’s profit increases more (333.02%) and the real 
income of poorest rural households increases more (0.15%). As expected, the increase 
in the capital supply elasticity leads to the processor’s profit increase because of 
increasing high standards intermediate products, and hence increases their chances to 
                                                 
50 A full set of sensitivity analysis results is available from the authors upon request. 
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enter into contracts. At the same time, the welfare of the poorest rural households 
increases. 
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of different profit transfer rate of poorest rural 
households. When the profit transfer rate is equal to 0.9, 90% of profit surplus due to 
credit grant is transferred to the processor. Higher profit transfer rate means weaker 
bargaining power. In the baseline simulation, when 90% of the profit surplus is 
transferred to the processor, the processor’s profit increases a lot (229.39%) and the 
real income of poorest rural households increases a little (0.1%). And when 50% of 
the profit surplus is transferred to the processor, the processor’s profit increases less 
(174.86%) and the real income of poorest rural households increases more (0.49%). 
These results mean that the decrease of profit transfer to the processor increases their 
real income (as compared to when they keep a smaller share of the profits for 
 
Figure 4.2 Contracts with Profit Transfers: Impact of Higher Capital Supply 
Elasticity of Poorest Rural Households 
(Percentage Change; Baseline=Sim 9A) 
  
 
Baseline 
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Figure 4.3 Contracts with Profit Transfers: Impact of Profit Transfer Rate of 
Poorest Rural Households 
(Percentage Change; Baseline=Sim 10A) 
 
themselves, all else equal), but obviously also decreases the contracting opportunities 
for small farmers because the processor gains less from contracts. The figure clearly 
shows the trade-off between getting contracts and gaining more from contracts. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze how a processor determines which farmer type to 
contract with and how this choice affects the incomes of different types of rural and 
urban households. Through a CGE model, which is a modified version of the model in 
Chapter 3, we simulate the decision making of the high standards processor and its 
impact on the incomes of households under conditions with and without profit 
transfers. First, we find that the high standards processor prefers entering into 
contracts with corporate farms because those can most efficiently transform the 
provided capital into output when there is no bargaining on the profit surpluses of 
farmers. Second, even when the processor can appropriate a share of the surplus from 
Baseline 
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its suppliers and corporate farms have stronger bargaining power than other farms, 
corporate farms are preferred because of the dominating efficiency effect in our 
simulation conditions. However, when surpluses are shared, the weaker bargaining 
power of poorest rural households may make them more attractive contract partners 
than other rural households. If poor rural households enter into these contracts, they 
can benefit, even though they will benefit less than in the case without surplus 
sharing. The latter case is however less likely to occur due to competition for 
contracts between farmers, i.e., the processor will choose corporate farms to contract 
with and poor rural households have no chances of getting contracts because 
corporate farms are more efficient to utilize the extra credit and hence help the 
processor to increase its profits. In the case of China, where there are few corporate 
farms, poor rural households can get more chances of contracting. 
Contracts in the high standards sector can serve as an instrument for poverty 
reduction. We find that inclusion in high standards farming is an effective instrument 
for poverty reduction. The efficiency consideration of processors may exclude small 
farmers. However, if processors take into account the weaker bargaining power of 
small farmers, the latter may have more chances to be included. 
In several simulations, results are highly affected by the assumption of 
distribution of profits among domestic factor owners. If this assumption is not robust, 
results will be different. For example, when the high standards sector is dominated by 
foreign firms, profits may be transferred abroad. As a result, rural households may 
benefit less since they cannot capture a share of the increased profits from processors. 
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Chapter 5. An Application of the General Equilibrium Model: Scandal and Reforms in 
China’s Dairy Sector 
 
5.1. Introduction 
A series of recent studies have identified the spread of ‘high standards’ as having a 
fundamental impact on the process of development (Farina and Reardon, 2000; Swinnen, 
2007). The growing demand of wealthy consumers for high quality, safety, health, and ethical 
standards put pressure on governments to increase public regulatory standards and on private 
processing and retailing companies to introduce or tighten private corporate standards 
(Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008). 
Although high standards emerged initially in rich countries, they now affect poorer 
countries through several channels. First, standards in richer countries are also imposed on 
imports and consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting nations 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Unnevehr, 2000). Second, global supply chains are playing an 
increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these vertically 
coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing standards (Swinnen, 2007). Third, 
higher standards in developed countries are often regarded as a guarantee of quality and gain 
preference of consumers with higher income in developing countries. This is especially the 
case when the demand for high standards products cannot be satisfied by local suppliers. 
Take China as an example. Constrained by imperfect factor markets, the food supply 
chain is unable to satisfy the fast growing demand for high standards food. The 
incompatibility between the fast growing demand and the laggard supply has been leading to 
some serious food safety problems, such as the tainted milk scandal which occurred in 2008 
(Faireclough and Chao, 2008; The Economist, 2008). After the milk scandal, the import of 
high standards milk products, such as baby formula, increased a lot. 
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Generally, food safety crises often evolve as follows (e.g., BSE crisis in EU, (Vos, 
2000)). First, following the crisis, consumer confidence plummets and the market collapses. 
Second, to regain confidence and rebuild the market, governments release regulations 
quickly. Third, the combined impact from the shock and the regulations often exclude the 
most vulnerable farmers from the market. Foreseeing this negative impact, governments 
usually introduce some policies like interim subsidies to attenuate the cost of adjustment. 
The Chinese tainted milk scandal proceeded in a similar way but with some special 
characteristics due to the peculiar structure of the Chinese dairy market. More specifically, 
there is fierce competition, on the one hand among millions of small dairy farmers, on the 
other hand among hundreds of dairy processing companies (Huang et al., 2007). In between, 
there are numerable intermediary traders (or middlemen) and milk stations. Although such a 
system is found to be inclusive for poor farmers as no midstream firm exerts market power 
(Huang et al., 2008), it does lead to weak traceability, limited capacity for food safety 
management and low compliance with food safety standards. Policy makers face a critical 
dilemma between upgrading the dairy production system to higher quality and safety 
standards (for which increasing scale would probably be a condition sine qua non), and 
ensuring continued involvement of small-scale farmers who derive their primary incomes 
from milk production. The outbreak of the scandal and the subsequent dairy reforms provide 
a unique opportunity to investigate the possible impacts of differently oriented policies. 
Note that since the dairy sector is relatively small, constituting only 0.1% of the whole 
economy, its impact on the overall economy is very small, which means that the general 
equilibrium effects may not be significant. Hence, the simulations in this chapter should 
mainly be regarded as an exercise to show how to implement our model for the analysis of 
some special events. However, using CGE to analyze changes in small sectors is not a new 
90                                                                                                                                                       Chapter 5 
 
idea (see e.g., Konan and van Assche (2007) on telecom in Tunisia and Waschik and Fraser 
(2007) on wool industry in Australia). 
 
5.2. Overview of the Process of the Scandal and the 
Following Reforms 
The 2008 Chinese milk scandal was a food safety incident in China involving milk 
and infant formula, and other food materials and components, adulterated with melamine. 
The root of the scandal lies in the fast growing demand for milk in combination with a 
backward supply system. Since 1998, fluid milk consumption in urban China has grown 
annually at double digit rates (Fuller et al., 2006). However, the growth of demand created 
various inefficiencies as adaptation to marketing rules, infrastructure, and institutions have 
not kept pace with the changing environment. The regulation system also lagged far behind 
the demand (Enderwick, 2009). 
The scandal raised concerns about food safety in mainland China, and damaged the 
reputation of China's food exports with at least 25 countries stopping all imports of mainland 
Chinese dairy products (Enderwick, 2009). Consumer panic resulting from the contaminated 
milk lowered overall demand for dairy products substantially. 
Shortly after the scandal erupted, sales fell by 30-40% on a comparative basis, 
according to the Chinese Dairy Association. The Association estimated that the financial 
effect is of the order of ¥20 billion, and forecasted that confidence might take up to two years 
to be fully restored. As a result of the huge decline in demand, many small farmers found 
themselves forced to pour away milk and sell off their cows. 
Admitting the lax ‘supervision and management’ by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, 
the Chinese government responded quickly to the food crisis by staging ‘The State Dairy 
Food Safety Supervision and Regulation Act’ (CSC, 2008) in an attempt to heavily regulate 
the dairy market and to restore consumer confidence, both domestically and internationally. 
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The featured act established specific barriers to market entry, e.g. requiring local 
governments to set a minimum scale for cow hotels,51 as well as the introduction of Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP). Meanwhile, reference prices for milk were fixed 
at the county-level in order to stabilize the market (State-Council, 2008, Oct. 9 Article No. 
23). On November 2008, a report named ‘Consolidation and Revitalization of the Dairy 
Industry’ (CNDRC, 2008) was jointly released by the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Industry, emphasizing the urge to increase the scale of dairy 
farming. For example, one of the outlined objectives was to ‘increase the share of large scale 
dairy hotels with more than 100 cows from less than 20% to around 30%’ by the end of 
October 2011. At the same time, this document described some policies to attenuate the 
negative effects of the market shock and the stringent regulations by giving interim relief 
subsidies to dairy farmers. In July 2009, a new dairy policy52
 
 was released jointly by the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Industry, imposing a 
substantial increase in the minimum investment threshold to enter dairy farming. These acts 
will no doubt raise operating and entry costs in the dairy industry and lead to more 
consolidation of the sector. As public standards are being tightened in the dairy sector in 
China, they will bring about upheaval in the production system, market structure, rural 
institutions, and millions of farmers’ welfare. 
5.3. Simulations 
We calibrate the model to the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) in Chapter 3 with a 
major modification: the data of the high standards farming sector are replaced by specific 
                                                 
51 This is the translation of the Chinese word ‘Yangzhixiaoqu’, referring to places where farmers jointly raise 
their cows.  
52 ‘Dairy Industry Policy (2009 Revised)’ (CNDRC, 2009) 
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data for high standards dairy farming (See Table 5.1 for details). The input/output, 
consumption and trade of this high standards sector are changed accordingly. 
Our main objective is to find the impact of the scandal and the following dairy 
reforms. This is realized by changing the preferences of consumers, increasing fixed costs of 
high standards dairy farming and giving subsidies to other rural households to relax their 
credit constraints. 
 
5.3.1. Increasing Preference for High Standards Dairy 
Products 
The direct impact of the scandal is the change in consumer preferences for high 
standards dairy products. Hence, first we simulate the scandal’s impact on demand by 
increasing the preference for high standards food. We explore this case under two situations: 
one with normal dairy imports and another with more elastic imports. Results are reported in 
the first two columns of Table 5.2. 
When consumer preferences for high standards dairy products increase 
( / 25%c cζ ζ∆ =− ) and the Armington elasticity of substitution for the high standards dairy 
sector is normal ( 3qHFσ = ), the real incomes of the poorest rural households and other rural 
households increase (by 0.20% and 0.07% respectively). The rise in the incomes results from 
increasing profits in high standards dairy farming (0.23% and 0.12% respectively). Increased 
preferences for high standards dairy products lead to a higher price of these products 
(+31.17%) and hence to a relatively higher production of high standards milk by the poorest 
as well as other rural households (31.09% and 30.58% respectively). 
However, the above case can happen only when these preferences change gradually 
with increasing income. If preferences change abruptly, for example as a result of a food 
crisis, imports may increase a lot, reflected in a higher Armington elasticity for the high
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Table 5.2 Simulation Results: The Same Technology in High Standards and Low 
Standards Dairy Farming 
(Percentage Change) 
Sim 11A: Households’ preferences for low standards food decrease by 25% 
( / 25%c cζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is normal ( 3
q
HFσ = ). 
Sim 11B: Households’ preferences for low standards food decrease by 25% 
( / 25%c cζ ζ∆ =− ); Import is normal ( 9qHFσ = ). 
Sim 12A: Fixed costs increase by 10 times ( / 10c cψ ψ∆ = ). 
Sim 12B: Fixed costs increase by 10 times ( / 10c cψ ψ∆ = ) and preference for high 
standards food increase by 25% ( / 25%c cζ ζ∆ =− ). 
Sim 13: Collateral of other rural households increase by 10 ( 10ORκ∆ = ).  
 Sim 11A Sim 11B Sim 12A Sim 12B Sim 13 
Gini coefficient 0.03 1.10 0.03 0.06 0.04 
Individual output of high 
standards intermediate product 
     
Poorest rural households 31.09 32.77 0.01 31.10 -0.92 
Other rural households 30.58 31.48 0.02 30.61 93.63 
Corporate farms 35.71 36.14 0.03 35.74 -1.08 
Domestic commodity price      
Low standards food -0.35 -3.17 -0.00 -0.35 -0.10 
High standards food 31.17 20.72 -0.01 31.15 -0.92 
Other commodities -0.16 -1.76 -0.00 -0.16 -0.02 
Factor price      
Rural labor  -0.24 -2.42 -0.02 -0.26 -0.08 
Urban labor  -0.07 -1.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 
Land -0.83 -7.21 -0.03 -0.86 -0.27 
Capital -0.26 -2.16 0.03 -0.23 -0.05 
Poorest rural households       
Profit effect 0.23 0.25 -0.04 0.18 -0.00 
Transferred profit from HS 
processor 
0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
Transferred profit from CF 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
Factor income effect -0.05 -0.45 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 
Among it:                         
Labor 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Land -0.05 -0.45 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 
Total income effect 0.20 -0.17 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 
Other rural households      
Profit effect 0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.10 0.04 
Transferred profit from HS 
processor 
0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Transferred profit from CF 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
Factor income effect -0.08 -0.53 -0.00 -0.08 -0.04 
Among it:                         
Labor -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Land -0.06 -0.46 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 
Capital -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
Total income effect 0.07 -0.37 -0.03 0.04 0.01 
Urban households      
Transferred profit from HS 
processor 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Transferred profit from CF 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Factor income effect -0.01 0.66 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
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Among it:                         
Labor 0.03 0.69 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
Capital -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
Total income effect 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.05 
 
standards dairy food. When preferences change and the Armington elasticity is higher 
( 9qHFσ = ), the real incomes of the poorest rural households and other rural households 
decrease (by 0.17% and 0.37% respectively). The decrease in incomes results from 
decreasing factor incomes (-0.45% and -0.53% respectively) even though they still have more 
profits (increasing by 0.25% and 0.13% respectively). The lower factor incomes come from 
the lower factor prices due to higher imports, leading to a reduction in demand for domestic 
factors. Competition with imported dairy products leads to a more moderate price increase of 
high standards dairy products (+20.72%, compared to 31.17% in the previous case). 
However, the factor prices decrease a lot and lead to higher profits in high standards dairy 
farming. 
 
5.3.2. Increasing Fixed Costs for High Standards Dairy 
Farming 
Shortly after the scandal, the government released new series of regulations, most of 
which required extra investments in the dairy production system. Hence, we explore the 
impact of stringent regulation by increasing the fixed capital costs of production. Results are 
reported in the third column of Table 5.2. 
When fixed capital costs in high standards dairy farming increase ( / 10c cψ ψ∆ = ), the 
real incomes of the poorest rural households and other rural households decrease (by 0.07% 
and 0.03% respectively). The reduction in incomes results from decreasing profits in high 
standards dairy farming (-0.04% and -0.02% respectively). Increasing fixed costs has no 
direct impact on the prices of high standards dairy products and only results in decreasing 
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profits. In fact, the price of high standards dairy products decreases by 0.01% due to a 
reduced overall income for the economy.53
However, if increased fixed costs lead to higher preferences for high standards dairy 
products, rural households may benefit. Simulation 8B shows the case where preferences for 
low standards dairy products decrease by 25% (
 
/ 25%c cζ ζ∆ =− ) simultaneously with the cost 
increase. The real incomes of the poorest rural households and other rural households 
increase (by 0.14% and 0.04% respectively). 
 
5.3.3. Subsidies to Large-scale Farmers 
To attenuate the negative impacts of the milk scandal, the Chinese government has 
given interim subsidies to those farmers above a specific threshold scale.54 Hence, we check 
the impact of subsidies by asymmetrically relaxing credit constraints of other rural 
households,55
When the collateral of other rural households increases (
 as the subsidies are usually given to them because of their larger scale of 
operation. Results are reported in the last column of Table 5.2. 
10ORκ∆ = ), the real incomes 
of the poorest rural households decrease by 0.03%. In contrast, the incomes of other rural 
households increase by 0.01%. The decrease in income of the poorest rural households results 
from a decreasing factor income (-0.04%). While the lower credit constraints lead to an 
expansion of the high standards farming sector, its expansion leads to the expansion of the 
high standards processing sector directly and of other commodities indirectly through the 
lower factor prices and higher real incomes. Both the high standards processing sector and 
                                                 
53 The real GDP decreases by 0.01%. The reason of decreasing overall income is due to the use of resources as 
investment costs. 
54 There is no national standard on this scale. Local governments decide it based on the local situations. For 
example, in Beijing, the minimum scale is twenty cows. Generally, this policy will benefit bigger farmers while 
doing harm to small farmers. 
55 Since we cannot differentiate the households involved in dairy farming from those which are not, we treat the 
archetype ‘other rural’ households as households which can benefit from the subsidy policy. This treatment will 
have no impact on the direction of the simulation results, but will attenuate the specific effects on those bigger 
dairy farming households. 
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the other commodity sector use more factors which are mainly located in the urban area such 
as urban labor and capital. As a result, those factors’ prices increase while other factors’ 
prices decrease. The overall factor income effect for the poorest rural households is negative. 
 
5.3.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
In order to assess the robustness of our results we perform sensitivity analysis of the 
key assumptions.56
Figure 5.2 shows that when credit constraints of other rural households are relaxed 
due to subsidies to larger dairy farmers, the welfare effects on the poorest rural households 
will be different. If we assume that larger farmers are more labor intensive (e.g., 50% more 
labor intensive), the poorest rural households experience positive welfare effects, originating 
from the positive labor market effect as the expansion of high standards dairy farming leads 
to an increased demand for rural labor. When the dairy production technology used by other 
rural households is neutral or capital intensive, the poorest rural households will lose. 
 Because increased fixed costs means higher quality standards and may 
lead to different scenarios of changes in preferences for high standards dairy products, we 
verify the results of these changes in Figure 5.1, showing that if the increase in fixed costs 
leads to a 15% reduction in preferences for low standards dairy products, the poorest rural 
households will benefit from this change. This result means that when consumers really 
prefer high standards food, increasing standards may induce a higher demand and hence 
benefit rural households even though they have to make extra investments to comply with the 
new standards. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 A full set of results from the sensitivity analyses is available from the authors upon request. 
98                                                                                                                                                     Chapter 5 
 
Figure 5.1 Welfare Change when Increased Investment Costs Lead to Preference for 
High Standards Dairy Products 
(Percentage Change; Baseline=Sim 11A) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Relaxing Credit Constraints for Other Rural Households under Different 
Technologies 
(Percentage Change; Baseline=Sim 13) 
 
 
Baseline 
Baseline 
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5.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter we analyze how the 2008 tainted milk scandal and the subsequent dairy 
reforms affect the incomes of different types of rural and urban households. Through a CGE 
model, which is a modified version of the model presented in Chapter 3, we simulate the 
impact of the milk scandal and dairy reforms by increasing consumer preferences for high 
standards dairy products, increasing the fixed costs of dairy farming and giving subsidies to 
other rural households. 
First, we find that under different assumptions on the Armington elasticity of 
substitution, rural households will be differently impacted by the scandal. When the elasticity 
is normal, rural households will benefit. However, when the elasticity is high, which is very 
likely during the outbreak of a scandal, rural households will lose. Second, when fixed costs 
increase, rural households will lose. Third, when credit constraints for other rural households 
are relaxed due to subsidies from the government, other rural households will benefit while 
the poorest rural households lose due to decreasing factor incomes. 
The real income of the poorest rural households decreases under nearly all the 
scenarios except when preferences for high standards dairy products increase while the 
Armington elasticity is normal. Hence, the government should pay due attention to the 
conditions of the poorest rural households while upgrading the dairy value chain. 
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Chapter 6. General Conclusions 
 
This dissertation focuses on the relations between food standards and development. 
Chapter 2 shows that initial differences in income, capital and transaction costs – as well as 
the possibility of contracting between producers and processors – affect the emergence of and 
the size of the high standards economy. Chapter 3 shows that how poor rural households are 
affected by the expansion of the high standards sector depends on the nature of the shocks 
leading to the expansion of the high standards sector and on the existence and type of market 
imperfections, and whether the poor can gain through the labor market if they are excluded 
from high standards farming. Chapter 4 shows that the choice of processors which type of 
supplier to contract with depends on farmer type characteristics, more specifically on the 
farmer’s efficiency and bargaining power. The weaker bargaining power of poor rural 
households increases profit transfers to the processor, and hence increases their probabilities 
of getting contracts and their income accordingly. Chapter 5 shows that during the 2008 
tainted milk scandal and the subsequent reforms in China, poor rural households lose in 
nearly all the scenarios except when consumer preferences for high standards dairy products 
increase while increases in imports remain moderate. 
The findings of this dissertation have several implications. First, both economic 
growth and institutions play a critical role for the inclusion of smallholders. Average income 
is a key determinant of the scale of the high standards food sector; production structures and 
contracting opportunities can induce the development of a high standards food sector; and 
transaction costs are also critically important in determining whether small farmers will or 
will not be included. Hence, economic growth as well as economic reforms, which may 
encourage private investment and decrease transaction costs, should be equally paid attention 
to. With capital market imperfections in developing countries, foreign companies often face 
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less restrictive credit constraints than domestic companies and are therefore able to invest 
when it is not possible for domestic companies to do so. 
Second, the expansion of the high standards food sector may affect rural households 
in several ways. They may expand their production of high standards products as the world 
price for high standards food increases, and as such raise their profits from high standards 
farming. Even though they may be excluded from product markets due to credit constraints, 
they may benefit from  factor market effects. Furthermore, the spillover effects of growth in 
demand for high standards products on other product markets (in particular markets for low 
standards products) may reduce prices for products which are preferred by rural households. 
Third, poor rural households will expand their production of high standards product 
with the increase of world price for high standards food. Expansion of high standards sector 
resulting from domestic preference changes may increase or decrease real incomes of poor 
rural households, and hence increases or decreases inequality (depending on whether HS 
production can compete with HS imports.). The effects are influenced by technology, 
required investment costs and factor market imperfections. 
Therefore, in order to design appropriate policies, all these effects should be jointly 
taken into consideration. Overlooking some effects may lead to biased, and sometimes 
wrong, policy conclusions. 
This dissertation provides several hypotheses for future empirical research projects. 
First, more research is needed to find out whether smallholders are actually included in and 
benefit from the expansion of the high standards sector and under which conditions our 
theoretical analysis indicate that farmers with a lower productivity may be excluded and 
hence lose the opportunity to benefit directly from the high standards sector. But they may 
benefit through the labor market. Second, while the representative ‘poorest rural’ households 
may benefit or lose as a group under scenarios we used, the distribution of benefits within 
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this group has not been explored, which means that some ‘poorest rural’ households may 
benefit while others lose. All these issues offer fertile ground for future empirical research. A 
panel data set would be particularly useful to estimate which share of the earnings of farms in 
the modern channel is due to participation in the channel, and which share is attributable to 
intrinsic characteristics of the farmer which would allow him/her to have superior earnings 
even without entering the modern channel. Third, no empirical studies so far have analyzed 
the spillover effects on other markets which our model show to be very important.  
There are also several issues which could benefit from further theoretical (and 
empirical) research. First, the assumed production structure in the general equilibrium 
framework may affect our results. Hence, future research may try to integrate the 
heterogeneous production structure in Chapter 2 into the general equilibrium model in 
Chapter 3 by following Melitz (2003) and Zhai (2008). Second, one could expect the models 
to include all the different actors in the value chains? My dissertation mainly focuses on the 
relation between farmers and processors. However, the relation between retailers, food 
industries and farmers is very important especially in the view of the ongoing supermarket 
revolution (Timmer, 2009). Since supermarkets play an increasingly important role in the 
food retail system and are often thought to have monopolistic power, farmers may improve 
their bargaining power by forming intermediate organizations, such as cooperatives. The 
formation of cooperatives and their impacts in an environment with strong involvement of 
supermarkets deserve more empirical and theoretical research. Third, the trade-off or 
competition between food security and food safety along with the implications for 
development calls for careful attention (Carvalho, 2006). Even though our general 
equilibrium model shows the spillover effect of an expanding high standards sector on prices 
of low standards food, these interactions need further exploration. Generally speaking, if 
development leads to increasing inequality in an initial stage, richer people may increase their 
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demand for food safety while poorer people continue to focus their efforts on achieving food 
security. Since food safety and food security both compete for the same factor endowment of 
a country, the government has to strike a balance between these objectives when making 
policy decisions. Fourth, one could further distinguish between standards than we have done. 
For example, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that specific standards, such as genetically 
modified (GM) food standards are used as protection against imports, a conclusion disputed 
by recent findings of e.g., Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008) and Marette and Beghin 
(2010). While developed countries have less incentives to adopt risky GM food, developing 
countries have more reasons for adoption. However, allowing GM food cultivation may 
negatively impact their opportunities to export to developed countries barring GM food 
(Vigani et al., 2010) and hence reduce their hope of developing through the use of innovative 
technologies. Our CGE model approach could provide an interesting extension of ongoing, 
mostly partial equilibrium, models. 
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Appendix. 
 
A. Data for Chapter 3 
The structure and characteristics of China’s economy are shown in Table 3.2. 
The System of National Accounts and its related data sets for China provide the 
starting point for our dataset of 2005, which is also the latest available dataset. Most 
data are collected from China Statistics Yearbook (CNBS, 2006). For those that can’t 
be found from the yearbook, we complement from other sources, like China 
Agriculture Yearbook (CMA, 2006) and the Input/output Table 2002.57
Essentially the procedure required to produce our data set involves extensions, 
modifications and redefinitions of concepts for portions of the national accounts data; 
the addition of further detail to this system; and final adjustments between blocks of 
data in order to restore mutual consistency. As we have stated that the concept of 
standards includes so many aspects that we cannot differentiate exactly which food 
belongs to high standards or not. Hence, we only make some approximation to 
describe a rough figure. 
 
A.1. Production 
GDP is 18.67 trillion Yuan and divided into the final commodity sectors: low 
and high standards food, and the other commodity sector. The shares of rural 
households and corporate farms in the high standards farming are estimated according 
to their farming areas. 
The parameters in production functions are determined by using either 
cost/revenue table or the input/output table according to the availability of data. The 
cost/revenue tables for the agriculture are used to calculate the contribution rates of 
                                                 
57 The input/output tables of China are edited once per five years. The Input/output Table 2002 is, 
hence, the latest available table. 
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low and high standards farming under our following assumption: Since the profit rate 
of contract farming is larger than that of non-contract farming from the sample data of 
Miyata et al. (2009), the difference (11.2%) is treated as the positive profit for high 
standards farming in our case. And we proxy the input/output of both high standards 
and low standards intermediate product by the weighted average of agricultural 
products including wheat, maize, rice tobacco, tea, peanut, sugar cane, beet and apple, 
etc. The contribution rates of factors in the processing sector are calculated from the 
Input/output Table 2002 (CNBS, 2006). The labor wages, amortization and 
intermediate input of construction sector are proxies of contributions of labor, capital 
and land. The wages in processing and industrial sectors are divided into rural and 
urban labor according to the aggregate ratio of rural to urban labor revenues. 
 
A.2. Household Income, Savings/Investment and 
Consumption 
From the expenditure side, GDP is divided into consumption, investment and 
net export. All the aggregate amounts can be found in the GDP structure from the 
yearbook. The disaggregate data of households are collected from the income and 
expenditure structures of individual households. 
The investment and net export are added up to the amount of savings. The 
individual household savings are calculated as income less consumption. However, 
the calculated saving rates seem too low, probably because of lack of treatment of 
government and corporate savings, and are enlarged to suit the aggregate saving 
amount according to their relative shares. The investments are sorted into the final 
commodity sectors according to their shares in input/output table. 
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The division of income between rural58
As far as the household income structures are concerned, the yearbook only 
divides income data into four parts: Income from wages and salaries, from household 
operations, from properties, and from transfers. The divisions among these items of 
income are not very clear and can’t be easily sorted into factor income and profit. We 
deal with them as follows: Income from wages and salaries is treated as wages and 
income from properties as capital income straightforwardly. Income from transfers is 
excluded since there is no government in our model. The most important income for 
rural households is the income from household operations. It is sorted into profit and 
factor incomes, including those from labor, from land and from capital, which are 
added into other factor incomes to get the final income structures of rural households. 
Even though the statistical income from operations includes other activities, like 
transportation, we use its total amount as proxy to farming operations since we cannot 
 and urban households is based on the 
income per capita and ratio of population. The consumption structures are calculated 
from the expenditure of households. Engel indices are used to divide food and non-
food consumptions. The expenditure on food is divided into consumptions of low and 
high standards food. The poorest rural households and urban households are assumed 
to consume the largest shares of low standards food (99.9%) and high standards food 
(6.7%) respectively. The consumption ratios of the other rural households are 
calculated by inserting numbers proportionally so that the overall consumption is 
equal to production minus investment. 
                                                 
58 Rural Households, according to the explanation of the yearbook, refer to usual resident households in 
rural areas. ‘Usual resident households in rural areas are households residing on a long term basis(for 
more than one year) in the areas under the administration of township governments (not including 
county towns), and in the areas under the administration of villages in county towns. Households 
residing in the current addresses for over one year with their household registration in other places are 
still considered as resident households of the locality. For households with their household registration 
in one place but all members of the households having moved away to make a living in another place 
for over one year, they will not be included in the rural households of the area where they are 
registered, irrespective of whether they still keep their contracted land.’ (CNBS, 2006) 
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differentiate them. As for urban households, its income from wages and salaries is 
treated as income from labor. And the incomes from household operations and from 
properties are added up to income from capital.59
Because of transportation cost of migration between rural and urban regions, 
the wages earned in the two regions are different. The gap between wage of rural 
labor working in urban region (8520 Yuan according to PBC (2006)) and average 
income per labor in rural region (6948 Yuan) 
 
60
 
 is treated as the iceberg costs. The 
implicit assumption under the use of income per rural labor as the base of comparison 
is that rural laborer makes the decision of migration by comparing that income with 
wage in urban region. 
A.3. External Sector 
All final commodities are tradable and have both export and import. 
 
A.4. ‘RAS’ Adjustments61
After the adjustments, modifications and additions listed above are completed, 
the remaining inconsistencies in our data set involve major data blocks which need to 
be realigned so as to satisfy (or restore in certain cases) equilibrium conditions. 
 
In the ‘RAS’ procedure a non-negative matrix which does not initially meet 
prescribed non-negative row and column sum constraints is restored to a situation of 
consistency through a sequence of alternating operations on rows and columns of the 
matrix. First row constraints are satisfied, then column constraints, then row 
constraints, and so on until a consistent matrix is achieved. The sums of prespecified 
                                                 
59 Even though the migrants from rural to urban may keep their rights in the rural land, we don’t count 
it in because of the unavailability of data. 
60 Because all the incomes earned by rural households are attached to their operations in rural activities, 
they are the best alternative choice to wages earned in urban area.  
61 This method is referred to St-Hilaire and Whalley (1983). 
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row and column constraints must be the same since they both provide the matrix sum. 
If the matrix is everywhere dense, convergence is assured. 
After the ‘RAS’ procedure, the GDP as a whole only increases 0.7%. The 
largest modification is to decrease the consumption of high standards food for urban 
households by 57.8%. This may be a signal that we have no precise data on high 
standards food consumption and that high standards food consists of a very small part 
of the whole economy and is more vulnerable to change. Considering the limited data 
availability against intensive use of data, such scale of data modification is thought to 
be acceptable. 
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B. Sensitivity Analyses for Chapter 3 
In order to assess the robustness of our results we perform sensitivity analysis 
of the key assumptions.62
( )1.35,  0.9,  0.45RPς ∈
 First, our results are robust to alternative assumptions on 
income elasticities of low standards products ( for the poorest 
rural households, and structural modification of elasticities for the other households). 
Second, alternative choices of the elasiticities of transformation 
( ( )0.6,  1.2, 1.8tLFσ ∈ , ( )0.6,  1.2, 1.8tHFσ ∈  and ( )0.4,  0.8,  1.2tOσ ∈ ) and the 
elasticities of substitution ( ( )1.5,  3.0, 4.5qLFσ ∈ , ( )1.5,  3.0, 4.5qHFσ ∈  and 
( )0.25,  0.5,  0.75qOσ ∈ ) yield only marginal changes to our comparative static results 
in the simulations of trade and credit constraints, while they have some impacts on the 
simulations of preference changes. The reason why the simulation results of 
preference change are sensitive to different assumptions of elasticities in trade lies in 
the fact that higher values of elastisities of substitution between domestic and foreign 
markets will benefit those consumers and producers who are highly involved in the 
outward-oriented sector. 
Third, alternative choices of the substitution elasticities between factors 
( ( )0.35,  0.7,  1.05sRσ ∈ , ( )0.075,  0.15,  0.225spoσ ∈ , ( )0.4,  0.8,  1.2sPSσ ∈  and 
( )0.45,  0.9,  1.35sOσ ∈ ) yield only small changes in the results for the simulations of 
trade and credit constraints. They do have some significant impacts on the simulations 
of preference changes. But the signs of the effects do not change. For example, 
increasing these substitution elasticities will decrease the income of the poorest rural 
households more (from -0.09% to -0.13%), decrease the income of the other rural 
                                                 
62 A full set of sensitivity analyzes results is available from the authors upon request. 
120                                                                                                                                        Appendix 
 
households less (from -0.16% to -0.15%) and increase the income of urban 
households less (from +0.31% to +0.29%). 
In summary, our results are robust to variations in all these parameters. 
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C. Data for Chapter 5 
The basic structure of SAM has been formed in Chapter 4. We supplement it 
with data on the dairy sector. The sources are the public yearbooks of the dairy sector 
and our survey carried out in 2009. The main changes are the input/output structure of 
the high standards farming sector, the share of this sector and the trade in this sector, 
etc.. The main modifications are shown as follows. 
 
C.1. Production 
The total output value for the dairy sector is 59.79 billion Yuan. We assume 
20% of it satisfies relatively high standards. Thus, the high standards dairy sector has 
a scale of 11.96, about 0.5% of the total value of agricultural raw material. The shares 
of rural households and corporate farms in the high standards dairy sector are 
calculated according to their output. The poorest rural households, other rural 
households and the corporate farms are assumed to produce 10%, 80% and 10% of the 
whole output. The input/output data for the dairy sector is not available. We stick to 
the previous input/output data for high standards farming. Since the profit rate of 
dairy is larger than other agricultural sectors, we set the profit rate as 19.5% (CDA, 
2006). 
 
C.2. Household Consumption 
The yearbook only provides per capita consumption for rural and urban 
households. We decompose the rural consumption by assuming that the poorest rural 
households consume only 0.5 kg per capita per year. And then the other rural 
households consume 1.4 kg per capita per year. 
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C.3. External Sector 
The trade in dairy sector is regarded as the trade in high standards dairy sector 
since almost all tradable dairy products are high standards products. The data include 
all the dairy products such as liquid milk, milk powder and dry milk, etc.. 
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Figure A3.1 Export-led Expansion with Different Income Elasticities 
 
Figure A3.2 Export-led Expansion with Different Amington Elasticities 
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Figure A3.3 Domestic Demand Growth with Different Substitution Elasticities 
 
 
Figure A3.4 Domestic Demand Growth with Different Elasticities of 
Transformation 
   
 
Figure A4.1 Modified CGE Model Structure 
 
Note: Difference from Figure 3.1 is shown by †.
Households 
Rural household (CR) 
Endow.: Rural labour,  Land , Capital (LR, A, K) 
Low standards 
inter.: 
fL(LR,A,K) 
Zero profit 
Rural household (CR): 
High standards inter.: 
fHRC(LR,A,K) 
Positive profit 
Low standards food market High standards food market 
High standards processing: † 
fHF(LR,LU,A,K,QXIH) 
Positive profit 
Other commodities market 
Urban Household (CU) 
Endow.: Urban labour;  Capital (LU,  K) 
Other commodities 
production 
fO(LR,LU, K) 
Zero profit 
ROW high standard food market ROW other commodities market 
Factor flows Commodity flows Intermediate flows 
ROW low standard food market 
Activities 
Domestic 
markets 
Foreign 
markets 
Corporate farm (CF): 
High standards inter.: 
fHCF(LR,A,K) 
Positive profit 
Low standards processing: 
fLF(LR,LU,A,K,QXIL) 
Zero profit 
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Table A3.1 The Model 
Production and factor demand  
( , , )b b b b bQX CES LR A Kφ=  (A1) 
( ( , ), )O O OL O O OQX CES CD LR LU Kφ φ=  (A 2) 
( ( ( , ), , ), )po po poS poL po po po po poQX CES CES CD LR LU A K QXIφ φ φ=  (A 3) 
,
cc c
HK r c CR CF
εκ= ∈   (A 4) 
*( , , , )L L L RLR LR PX wr t r=  (A 5) 
*( , , ; ),c c cH H H R HLR LR PX wr t K c CR CF= ∈   (A 6) 
*( , , , , )po po R poLl Ll wr wu t r PXI=  (A 7) 
*( , , , )O O O ULl Ll PX wr wu r=  (A 8) 
*( , , , )L L L RA A PX wr t r=  (A 9) 
*( , , , ; ),c c cH H H R HA A PX wr t r K c CR CF= ∈   (A 10) 
*( , , , , )po po R poA A wr wu t r PXI=  (A 11) 
*( , , , )L L L RK K PX wr t r=  (A 12) 
*( , , , , )po po R poK K wr wu t r PXI=  (A 13) 
*( , , , )O O O UK K PX wr wu r=  (A 14) 
*( , , , , )po po R poX X wr wu t r PXI=  (A 15) 
Income and demand  
( , , ) ( ) ( ),c c c c c c c c cH H H H H R H H HPX f LR A K wr LR tA r K c CR CFϕ ψ∏ = − + − − + ∈   (A 16) 
+ , 
+ ,                   
c c c c c CF
Rc
c c c CF
wr LR tA rK c CR
Y
wuLU rK c CU
γ
γ
 + + +∏ ∏ ∈= 
+ ∏ ∈
 
(A 17) 
(1 ) ,
c c c
c c cHF
HF LF
HF
a mps YX a c C
PQ
ζ
−
= − ∈  
(A 18a) 
(1 ) ,
c c c
c c cLF HF
LF LF
LF LF
a mps Y PQX a c C
PQ PQ
ζ
−
= + ∈  
(A 18b) 
(1 ) (1 ) ,
c c
c c cLF HF
O
O
a aX mps Y c C
PQ
− −
= − ∈  
(A 18c) 
Subject to the household budget constraint: 
(1 ) ,c c cm m
m M
PQ X mps Y c C
∈
• = − ∈∑  
 
Savings and investment  
* ,c c cS mps Y c C= ∈  (A 19) 
*m mQINV qinv IADJ=  (A 20) 
* *c cm m
m M c C
FSAV PQ QINV mps Y
∈ ∈
+ =∑ ∑  (A 21) 
Foreign trade  
( , )m m m mQQ aq CES QM QD=  (A 22) 
( , )m m m mQX at CET QE QD=  (A 23) 
1/(1 )( * )
1
q
m
q
m m m
q
m m m
QQ PD
QD QM
σδ
δ
+=
−
 (A 24)  
1/ ( 1)1( * )
t
m
t
m m m
t
m m m
QE PE
QD PD
σδ
δ
−−=  
(A 25) 
*m mPM pwm EXR=  (A 26) 
*m mPE pwe EXR=  (A 27) 
* * *m m m m m mPQ QQ PD QD PM QM= +  (A 28) 
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* * *m m m m m mPX QX PD QD PE QE= +  (A 29) 
*m m
m
CPI PQν=∑  (A 30) 
*m m
m
PPI PIµ=∑  (A 31) 
Equilibrium conditions  
(a) Demands equal supply for factors  
* * * / c ci po U
i B po c CR CF c CR
LR LR LR Lτ ϕ
∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑

 (A 32) 
* U
m
m
LU L=∑  (A 33) 
* * c
i po
i B po c C
A A A
∈ ∈
+ =∑ ∑ ∑  (A 34) 
* * *c c c
L H po O
c CR CF po c CR CF c C
K K K K Kψ
∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + + =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 (A 35) 
(b) Demands equal supply for goods  
*c
m m m
c
X QINV QQ+ =∑  (A 36) 
po poX QXI=  (A 37) 
(c) Current account balance for ROW (in domestic currency)  
* *m m m m
m m
PE QE PM QM FSAV= +∑ ∑  (A 38) 
  
Endogenous variables   
Rwr , Uwr , wu , t , r   Price of factors 
iPX  Producer price of activity i 
poPXI  Producer price of intermediate product 
mPQ  Price of composite good 
mPD           Price of domestically produced good for domestic market 
mPE          Export price in domestic currency 
c∏  Profit for high standards farming to agent c 
cγ   Endogenous share parameters of transferred profit from corporate farms 
iLR , iLU , iA , iK  Demand of factor from activity i 
poX  Demand of intermediate input from processing sector po 
*c
mX  Consumption of commodity m by households c 
iQX  Domestic production 
poQXI  Production of intermediate input in processing sector po 
mQQ  Domestic demand for composite good 
mQD          Domestic demand for domestically produced good 
mQE            Export 
cY   Income of households c 
c
bYF            Factor income of households c from factor b 
IADJ  Investment adjustment factor 
QINVm  Quantity of investment demand for commodity m 
CPI Aggregate consumer price 
PPI Aggregate producer price 
Exogenous variables and coefficients 
iφ  Efficient parameter of activity i for different level of nests 
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,c c CR CFκ ∈   Collateral of agent c in high standards farming  
c
ma  Share parameter of household consumption spending on 
commodity m 
mpwe   Export price for m (foreign currency) 
mpwm   Import price for m (foreign currency) 
mν       Weight of commodity m in the CPI 
mµ  Weight of commodity m in the PINDEX 
cLR , cLU , cA , cK   Household endowment 
τ  Migration cost rate 
cmps   Marginal (and average) propensity to save for households c 
mqinv  Baseline quantity of fixed investment demand 
q
mσ  Armington elasticities of substitution 
t
mσ  Elasticities of transformation 
cϕ  Fixed costs in the form of rural labor 
cψ  Fixed costs in the form of capital 
FSAV  Foreign savings (domestic currency) 
Numeraire  
EXR  Exchange rate (dom. Currency per unit of for. Currency) 
Functions  
CES Constant elasticity of substitution function 
CD Cobb-Douglas function 
CET Constant elasticity of transformation function 
Indices and sets  
i Index for activities, i I∈  
b Index for intermediate sectors b B L H∈ =   
po Index for processing sectors po LF HF∈   
j Index for factors, j J∈  
l Index for labor categories, l LR LU= ∪  
c Index for agents, c C CO∈   
m Index for commodities, m M∈  
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Table A3.2 Export-led Expansion under Different Technologies 
( / 25%HF HFpwe pwe∆ =+  and / 25%HF HFpwm pwm∆ =+ ) 
Sim 3A: 15% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
Sim 3B: 150% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
 Sim 3A Sim 3B 
Aggregate effects   
Real GDP -0.04 -0.05 
CPI  0.46 0.52 
Gini coefficient -0.25 -0.31 
Consumptions   
Low standards food 0.64 0.53 
High standards food -60.87 -53.69 
Other commodities 0.04 0.05 
Output of final commodities   
Low standards food 0.52 0.39 
High standards food 3.15 22.44 
Other commodities -0.11 -0.13 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households 2.07 18.04 
Other rural households 2.77 22.22 
Corporate farms 3.02 22.10 
Trade   
Import volume   
Low standards food 2.59 2.75 
High standards food -79.09 -75.14 
Other commodities 0.23 0.26 
Export volume   
Low standards food -0.23 -0.47 
High standards food 22.93 47.05 
Other commodities -0.39 -0.45 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households 8.92 25.78 
Other rural households 9.65 30.23 
Corporate farms 9.92 30.11 
Domestic consumer price   
Low standards food 0.64 0.73 
High standards food 1.67 1.58 
Other commodities 0.37 0.43 
Company food price   
Low standards food 0.63 0.72 
High standards food 7.34 7.30 
Other commodities 0.35 0.40 
Farm gate price   
Low standards intermediate product 0.65 0.75 
High standards intermediate product           10.26 10.17 
Factor price   
Rural labor  0.50 0.62 
Urban labor  0.26 0.29 
Land 1.46 1.63 
Capital 0.43 0.45 
Poorest rural households    
Profit effect from high standards 
farming 
0.03 0.03 
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Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect 0.08 0.13 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.00 0.04 
Land 0.08 -0.02 
Total income effect 0.11 0.17 
Other rural households   
Profit effect from high standards 
farming 
0.03 0.03 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect 0.09 0.12 
Among it:                       
Labor 0.01 0.04 
Land 0.08 0.09 
Capital -0.01 -0.01 
Total income effect 0.12 0.16 
Urban households   
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.00 
Factor income effect -0.14 -0.16 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.13 -0.15 
Capital -0.00 -0.00 
Total income effect -0.14 -0.16 
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Table A3.3 Domestic Growth Expansion under Different Technologies 
( / 25%U Uζ ζ∆ =− ) 
Sim 4A: 15% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
Sim 4B: 150% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
 Sim 4A Sim 4B 
Aggregate effects   
Real GDP 0.15 0.18 
CPI  -1.02 -1.18 
Gini coefficient 0.50 0.52 
Output of final commodities   
Low standards food -1.62 -2.43 
High standards food 6.26 59.78 
Other commodities 0.32 0.35 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households 4.42 48.01 
Other rural households 5.12 59.01 
Corporate farms 4.68 57.64 
Trade   
Import volume   
Low standards food -6.29 -7.74 
High standards food 247.51 319.05 
Other commodities -0.49 -0.57 
Export volume   
Low standards food 0.19 -0.36 
High standards food -15.29 33.75 
Other commodities 0.96 1.09 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households 10.55 66.68 
Other rural households 25.00 83.29 
Corporate farms 21.73 80.88 
Domestic consumer price   
Low standards food -1.52 -1.75 
High standards food 11.04 9.23 
Other commodities -0.85 -0.98 
Company food price   
Low standards food -1.51 -1.73 
High standards food 20.79 15.97 
Other commodities -0.79 -0.91 
Farm gate price   
Low standards intermediate product -1.56 -1.78 
High standards intermediate product           30.33 23.48 
Factor price   
Rural labor  -1.20 -1.23 
Urban labor  -0.53 -0.61 
Land -3.39 -3.99 
Capital -1.04 -1.30 
Poorest rural households    
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.11 0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.01 
Factor income effect -0.24 -0.15 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.04 0.09 
Land -0.20 -0.24 
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Total income effect -0.13 -0.04 
Other rural households   
Profit effect from high standards farming 0.11 0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.01 
Factor income effect -0.27 -0.27 
Among it:                       
Labor -0.07 0.01 
Land -0.21 -0.25 
Capital 0.01 -0.02 
Total income effect -0.16 -0.15 
Urban households   
Profit sharing from corporate farm 0.00 0.01 
Factor income effect 0.29 0.33 
Among it:                       
Labor 0.31 0.38 
Capital -0.02 -0.05 
Total income effect 0.29 0.33 
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Table A4.1 The Modified CGE Model 
Production and factor demand  
( , , )b b b b bQX CES LR A Kφ=  (A1) 
( ( , ), )O O OL O O OQX CES CD LR LU Kφ φ=  (A 2) 
( ( ( , ), , ), )po po poS poL po po po po poQX CES CES CD LR LU A K QXIφ φ φ=  (A 3) 
,
cc c
HK r c CR CF
εκ= ∈   (A 4) 
*( , , , )L L L RLR LR PX wr t r=  (A 5) 
*( , , ; ),c c cH H H R HLR LR PX wr t K c CR CF= ∈   (A 6) 
*( , , , , , )LF LF LF R LFLl Ll PX wr wu t r PXI=  (A 7) 
*( , , , , , )HF HF HF R HFLl Ll AC wr wu t r PXI=  (A 8) † 
*( , , , )O O O ULl Ll PX wr wu r=  (A 9) 
*( , , , )L L L RA A PX wr t r=  (A 10) 
*( , , , ; ),c c cH H H R HA A PX wr t r K c CR CF= ∈   (A 11) 
*( , , , , , )LF LF LF R LFA A PX wr wu t r PXI=  (A 12) 
*( , , , , , )HF HF HF R HFA A AC wr wu t r PXI=  (A 13) † 
*( , , , )L L L RK K PX wr t r=  (A 14) 
*( , , , , , )LF LF LF R LFK K PX wr wu t r PXI=  (A 15) 
*( , , , , , )HF HF HF R HFK K AC wr wu t r PXI=  (A 16) † 
*( , , , )O O O UK K PX wr wu r=  (A 17) 
*( , , , , , )LF LF LF R LFX X PX wr wu t r PXI=  (A 18) 
*( , , , , , )HF HF HF R HFX X AC wr wu t r PXI=  (A 19) † 
( ) / 1 /poH poH poHPXI AC PXI ε− =  (A 20) † 
Income and demand (A 21) 
( , , ) ( ) ( ),c c c c c c c c cH H H H H R H H HPX f LR A K wr LR tA r K c CR CFϕ ψ∏ = − + − − + ∈    
( )poH poH poHPXI AC QX∏ = −  (A 22) † 
+ + , 
+ + ,                   
poHc c c c c CF c
Rc
poHc c c CF c
wr LR tA rK c CR
Y
wuLU rK c CU
γ β
γ β
 + + +∏ ∏ ∏ ∈= 
+ ∏ ∏ ∈
 
(A 23) † 
(1 ) ,
c c c
c c cHF
HF LF
HF
a mps YX a c C
PQ
ζ
−
= − ∈  
(A 24a) 
(1 ) ,
c c c
c c cLF HF
LF LF
LF LF
a mps Y PQX a c C
PQ PQ
ζ
−
= + ∈  
(A 24b) 
(1 ) (1 ) ,
c c
c c cLF HF
O
O
a aX mps Y c C
PQ
− −
= − ∈  
(A 24c) 
Subject to the household budget constraint: 
(1 ) ,c c cm m
m M
PQ X mps Y c C
∈
• = − ∈∑  
 
Savings and investment  
* ,c c cS mps Y c C= ∈  (A 25) 
*m mQINV qinv IADJ=  (A 26) 
* *c cm m
m M c C
FSAV PQ QINV mps Y
∈ ∈
+ =∑ ∑  (A 27) 
Foreign trade  
( , )m m m mQQ aq CES QM QD=  (A 28) 
( , )m m m mQX at CET QE QD=  (A 29) 
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1/ (1 )( * )
1
q
m
q
m m m
q
m m m
QQ PD
QD QM
σδ
δ
+=
−
 (A 30) 
1/( 1)1( * )
t
m
t
m m m
t
m m m
QE PE
QD PD
σδ
δ
−−=  
(A 31) 
*m mPM pwm EXR=  (A 32) 
*m mPE pwe EXR=  (A 33) 
* * *m m m m m mPQ QQ PD QD PM QM= +  (A 34) 
* * *m m m m m mPX QX PD QD PE QE= +  (A 35) 
*m m
m
CPI PQν=∑  (A 36) 
*m m
m
PPI PIµ=∑  (A 37) 
Equilibrium conditions  
(a) Demands equal supply for factors  
* * * / c ci po U
i B po c CR CF c CR
LR LR LR Lτ ϕ
∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑

 (A 38) 
* U
m
m
LU L=∑  (A 39) 
* * c
i po
i B po c C
A A A
∈ ∈
+ =∑ ∑ ∑  (A 40) 
* * *c c c
L H po O
c CR CF po c CR CF c C
K K K K Kψ
∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + + =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 (A 41) 
(b) Demands equal supply for goods  
*c
m m m
c
X QINV QQ+ =∑  (A 42) 
po poX QXI=  (A 43) 
Current account balance for ROW (in domestic currency)  
* *m m m m
m m
PE QE PM QM FSAV= +∑ ∑  (A 44) 
  
Endogenous variables   
Rwr , Uwr , wu , t , r   Price of factors 
iPX  Producer price of activity i 
poPXI  Producer price of intermediate product 
mPQ  Price of composite good 
mPD           Price of domestically produced good for domestic market 
mPE          Export price in domestic currency 
AC† Average cost of high standards processor 
c∏  Profit for high standards farming to agent c 
poH∏ † Profit for high standards processor 
cγ   Endogenous share parameters of transferred profit from corporate farms 
cβ † 
Endogenous share parameters of transferred profit from high 
standards processor 
iLR , iLU , iA , iK  Demand of factor from activity i 
poX  Demand of intermediate input from processing sector po 
*c
mX  Consumption of commodity m by households c 
iQX  Domestic production 
poQXI  Production of intermediate input in processing sector po 
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mQQ  Domestic demand for composite good 
mQD          Domestic demand for domestically produced good 
mQE            Export 
cY   Income of households c 
c
bYF            Factor income of households c from factor b 
IADJ  Investment adjustment factor 
QINVm  Quantity of investment demand for commodity m 
CPI Aggregate consumer price 
PPI Aggregate producer price 
Exogenous variables and coefficients 
iφ  Efficient parameter of activity i for different level of nests 
,c c CR CFκ ∈   Collateral of agent c in high standards farming  
c
ma  Share parameter of household consumption spending on 
commodity m 
mpwe   Export price for m (foreign currency) 
mpwm   Import price for m (foreign currency) 
mqinv  Baseline quantity of fixed investment demand 
q
mσ  Armington elasticities of substitution 
t
mσ  
Elasticities of transformation 
mν       Weight of commodity m in the CPI 
mµ  Weight of commodity m in the PINDEX 
cLR , cLU , cA , cK   Household endowment 
τ  Migration cost rate 
cmps   Marginal (and average) propensity to save for households c 
cϕ  Fixed costs in the form of rural labor 
cψ  Fixed costs in the form of capital 
cε
 
Capital supply elasticity 
poHε † Perceived demand elasticity of high standards food 
FSAV  Foreign savings (domestic currency) 
Numeraire  
EXR  Exchange rate (dom. Currency per unit of for. Currency) 
Functions  
CES Constant elasticity of substitution function 
CD Cobb-Douglas function 
CET Constant elasticity of transformation function 
Indices and sets  
i Index for activities, i I∈  
b Index for intermediate sectors b B L H∈ =   
po Index for processing sectors po LF HF∈   
j Index for factors, j J∈  
l Index for labor categories, l LR LU= ∪  
c Index for agents, c C CO∈   
m Index for commodities, m M∈  
Note: Differences from Table A3.1 are shown by † 
 
136                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics, see:  
 
 
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/doctoraatsverdediging/archief.htm 
